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ROLLING BACK THE TIDE: TOWARD AN
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE FOR FLOOD INSURANCE
Alexander Lemann*
The National Flood Insurance Program is in flux—and under
attack. On March 13, 2014, Congress passed the Homeowner Flood
Insurance Affordability Act, delaying and dismantling many of the
reforms it had put in place just twenty months earlier, when it passed
the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012. Today,
flood insurance is both a critical part of the country’s approach to
dealing with the rising flood threat posed by climate change and a
beleaguered and perpetually broke symbol of governmental
ineptitude, leading to calls for its elimination. By providing federallysubsidized flood insurance, critics argue, the National Flood
Insurance Program has insulated flood victims from the risks they
face, encouraged development in flood prone areas and,
paradoxically, increased the country’s overall exposure to flooding.
This account, however, gives short shrift to the Program’s
sophistication and ability to discourage development in flood plains.
In fact, the Program’s woes can largely be traced to two intertwined
flaws: its weak mechanism for requiring coverage and its hesitation
to charge premiums that reflect the actual risk policyholders face. In
this Article, I argue that establishing an individual mandate for flood
insurance, which would require all property owners in flood-prone
areas to maintain policies, would do much to solve these problems
and make the National Flood Insurance Program a powerful tool in
the ongoing effort to mitigate our growing flood risk. By mandating
coverage and charging rates that reflect the risk faced by each
*

Associate, Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP. J.D., 2011, Columbia Law School, A.B.,
2006, Harvard College. The views expressed in this Article are mine and should
not be attributed to Sullivan & Cromwell or its clients. I would like to thank
Robert Ferguson and Oliver Houck for their comments, and Amanda Cook for her
insight, patience, and support. Many thanks as well to the staff of the Fordham
Environmental Law Review for their help in preparing this Article for publication.
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property, the National Flood Insurance Program could strike the
difficult balance between providing a safety net to flood victims and
discouraging flood-prone development, a goal that has eluded the
Program over the course of its forty-six year history.
I. INTRODUCTION
Flooding is the most common and most costly natural disaster in
the United States, and, thanks largely to climate change, the toll it
takes is increasing.1 Over the coming century, coastal areas will be
inundated by rising seas, pounded by powerful storms, and left
exposed by the erosion of wetlands and barrier islands. Inland areas,
particularly near rivers, will face increased flooding too, as patterns
of rainfall shift towards more frequent and intense downpours. The
United States is not, following the example of the Dutch, likely to
find comfort in a massive engineering solution. The flood risks we
face are too massive, and too geographically diffuse, to be mitigated
by a series of dams and levees, however expensive and complex.2 To
most who have examined the problem, the solution that presents
itself is retreat: we must begin to discourage new development in
flood-prone areas and encourage the abandonment of the riskiest
places.3
1. Patricia E. Salkin, 40th Anniversary of the Quiet Revolution in Zoning and
Land Use Regulation: Article: The Quiet Revolution and Federalism: Into the
Future, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 253, 272 (2012) (citing Rawle O. King, Federal
Flood Insurance: The Repetitive Loss Problem (Cong. Research Serv., RL 32972,
2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32972.pdf)). Between 1981
and 2011, flooding caused an average of nearly $8 billion in property and crop
damage per year, and killed 4,586 people. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH
PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE THIRD
NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 80 (Jerry M. Melillo, Terese Richmond, & Gary
W. Yohe, eds., 2014), available at nca2014.globalchange.gov [hereinafter Third
National Climate Assessment].
2. See, e.g., William J. Broad, In Europe, High-Tech Flood Control, with
Nature’s Help, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2005, at F1. Because half the Netherlands,
including both Amsterdam and Rotterdam, lies below sea level, the enormous cost
of the country’s sophisticated levee system is often expressed as a portion of the
gross national product. The geographic diversity of the flood risks confronting the
U.S. prevents this kind of project, or this kind of thinking.
3. See, e.g., Robert R.M. Verchick & Lynsey R. Johnson, When Retreat is the
Best Option: Flood Insurance After Biggert-Waters and Other Climate Change
Puzzles, 47 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 695, 696 (2014); Michael Kimmelman, Going
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The National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”) has the potential
to play a significant role in furthering this project. The NFIP has
long been controversial.4 Since its creation in 1968, it has provided
flood insurance, a market private companies had abandoned due to
the enormous, difficult to quantify, and highly correlated risks
involved. Premiums under the NFIP are in many cases “subsidized”
in the sense that they do not reflect the true measure of risk most
policyholders actually face. While the NFIP has made great strides
in evaluating flood risks and encouraging the adoption of mitigation
measures, its implied subsidy has been a near-constant source of
controversy and has plunged what was supposed to be a selfsustaining program deep into debt.5
Congress has frequently set out to reform the NFIP, usually with
lackluster results. In July 2012, Congress passed the Biggert-Waters
Flood Insurance Reform Act, a major step forward in eliminating
subsidized rates and giving the program a chance at self-sufficiency.6
As Biggert-Waters took effect and policyholders received notice that
their premiums would increase, however, a political backlash began
to grow against it, resulting in the repeal of certain key provisions by
the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, which
with the Flow, N.Y. TIMES, Feb 17, 2013, at AR1 (describing a proposal by
Governor Cuomo to pay residents of flood-prone areas to relocate); Lisa A. St.
Amand, Sea Level Rise and Coastal Wetlands: Opportunities for a Peaceful
Migration, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991) (describing a strategy of
“institutionalizing the presumption that humanly constructed structures will have to
give way to migrating wetlands as sea level rises”); NEW YORK STATE SEA LEVEL
RISE TASK FORCE, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 60 (2010), available at
www.dec.ny.gov/energy/67778.html (calling for reducing “incentives that increase
or perpetuate development in high-risk locations” and creating “incentives for
sustainable adaptation planning,” particularly “adaptive transition of infrastructure
and development over time”).
4. See generally Scott Gabriel Knowles & Howard C. Kunreuther, Troubled
Waters: The National Flood Insurance Program in Historical Perspective, 26 J.
POLICY HISTORY 327 (2014).
5. The NFIP has the statutory authority to borrow from the U.S. Treasury, up
to a certain limit. See infra note 113. The program always succeeded in paying
back what it owed, until 2005, when is suffered $19 billion in losses, more than the
total losses of the program since its inception. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
REDUCING COASTAL RISKS ON THE EAST AND GULF COASTS 41 (National
Academies Press 2014). As of 2013, its debt stood at $30.4 billion. Id.
6. See Knowles & Kunreuther, supra note 4, at 328-29; Verchick & Johnson,
supra note 3, at 708-09, 714-15.
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was signed into law on March 21st.7 These changes illustrate the
tension between providing a safety net in the form of affordable,
available flood insurance and the danger inherent in socializing the
costs of floods, which leads to a false sense of security and
encourages risky development.
A major hindrance in the NFIP’s efforts to strike the appropriate
balance between adequately insuring policyholders against risk and
providing a significant subsidy to flood-prone development has been
the lack of an individual mandate. The program’s “lender mandate,”
both underinclusive and underenforced, leaves a shocking number of
homeowners without flood insurance. It also leaves the NFIP
vulnerable to the “adverse selection” problem, a classic plague of
insurance markets in which those who face the lowest risk are the
most likely to opt-out of buying insurance.8 Requiring that all
property owners in flood-prone areas maintain flood insurance
policies would help both the NFIP and the urgent national project of
mitigating our exposure to flood risk in several important ways.
First, it would strengthen the NFIP financially, helping end its
crushing debt. Second, it would close some of the holes in its social
safety net, providing compensation to victims of floods predictably
and quickly, and relieving pressure on Congress to pass massive aid
packages in the wake of major disasters. Finally, and perhaps most
crucially, an individual mandate for flood insurance would
discourage development in flood-prone areas by monetizing and
annualizing the flood risk property owners face, helping overcome
the tangle of cognitive biases that prevent us from thinking about
unlikely yet catastrophic risks in rational ways.
Part II of this Article presents the problem of our national exposure
to flood risk, which is set to increase dramatically over the course of
the next century. Part III describes the NFIP in some detail and
examines the ways in which the program has helped quantify,
mitigate, and insure against flood risks. Part III also explores
Congress’s recent efforts to reform the NFIP, and the reasons some
observers have called for its outright elimination. In Part IV, I
present a proposed solution, an individual mandate for flood
insurance, and explore the ways in which mandated coverage and
actuarial rates would together help save the NFIP from the moral
7. Pub. L. No. 113-89, 128 Stat. 1020.
8. See infra Part III.F.
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hazard problem that has haunted it since before it was created. With
these reforms, I argue, the NFIP could be a powerful yet flexible tool
in discouraging flood-prone settlement, imposing on property owners
costs that, unlike the chance of a catastrophic flood, would be
impossible to ignore.
II. SEA LEVEL RISE, FLOODING, AND FEDERAL POLICY
Our changing climate will increase the flood risk we face in a few
important ways. First, the melting of polar ice caps and thermal
expansion of sea water will increase the volume of water in the
world’s oceans, leading to global increases in sea level. The rise in
sea level is sometimes estimated at between one and four feet over
the next century.9 The bottom end of that range, one foot of sea level
rise, is expected even without any contribution from melting ice
sheets in Greenland and Antarctica.10 Rising sea levels are worse
than a “flood” in the usual sense of the word: they lead to
“inundation,” a permanent retreat of the coastline as rising seas
forever submerge low-lying coastal areas.11 Moreover, the rate of sea
level rise is increasing. Since 1992, the rate of sea level rise has been
roughly twice the rate observed over the last century.
The intrusion of salty ocean water also destroys coastal wetlands,
eroding vast areas of land that form a buffer zone between populated
areas and the ocean.12 Southern Louisiana, for instance, has lost
1,880 square miles of coastal land since the 1930s, effectively
bringing New Orleans closer to the Gulf of Mexico while dismantling
its natural defenses against storm surges.13 The intensity, frequency,
and duration of hurricanes in the North Atlantic have increased since
the early 1980s, and they are expected to continue increasing as the
9. Third National Climate Assessment, supra note 1, at 44. Global sea level
has already risen about eight inches since the late nineteenth century. Id.
10. Id. at 45.
11. MATTHEW J.P. COOPER, MICHAEL D. BEEVERS, AND MICHAEL
OPPENHEIMER, FUTURE SEA LEVEL RISE AND THE NEW JERSEY COAST: ASSESSING
POTENTIAL IMPACTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 7 (Science, Technology and
Environmental Policy Program, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs, 2005).
12. See Third National Climate Assessment, supra note 1, at 582.
13. Id. at 402 (citing BRADY R. COUVILLION, ET AL., LAND AREA CHANGE IN
COASTAL LOUISIANA FROM 1932 TO 2010: U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY SCIENTIFIC
INVESTIGATIONS MAP 3164, available at pubs.usgs.gov/sim/3164/).

2015]

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

171

climate warms.14 The magnitude of the problem presented by rising
seas is staggering. In the United States alone, nearly 5 million people
live within four feet of the local high-tide level, and a sea level rise of
only two feet would inundate more than $1 trillion worth of
property.15
Nor are inland areas immune. Climate change has already begun
to worsen the frequency and severity of heavy rains. The U.S.
Global Change Research Program’s Third National Climate
Assessment listed among its “key messages” the fact that “heavy
downpours” are increasing, evidence of “a clear national trend
toward a greater amount of precipitation being concentrated in very
heavy events.”16 The Northeast, in particular, saw a 71 percent
increase in the amount of precipitation falling in the heaviest 1
percent of storms from 1958 to 2012.17 These trends are projected to
continue, even in regions where overall precipitation levels are
expected to decrease as a result of a warming climate.18 These
changes in rainfall are projected to lead, unsurprisingly, to an
increase in flooding along many rivers.19
14. Third National Climate Assessment, supra note 1, at 20, 41; COOPER, ET AL.,
supra note 11, at 9. While the National Climate Assessment notes that there is
disagreement among the models as to whether the strongest hurricanes are likely to
become more frequent, it warns that the models are “in better agreement when
projecting changes in hurricane precipitation – almost all existing studies project
greater rainfall rates in hurricanes in a warmer climate, with projected increases of
about 20% averaged near the center of hurricanes.” Third National Climate
Assessment, supra note 1, at 42.
15. Third National Climate Assessment, supra note 1, at 45, 589. The migration
of the U.S. population into coastal areas over the course of the second half of the
twentieth century is one reason the costs of flooding from coastal storms has
increased so dramatically. See Knowles & Kunreuther, supra note 4, at 327-28.
Since 1950, Florida, for instance, has experienced a 579 percent increase in
population, the highest in the nation, and has risen from the twentieth most
populous state to the fourth. Id.
16. Third National Climate Assessment, supra note 1, at 9.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 37; Robert R.M. Verchick & Abby Hall, Adapting to Climate Change
While Planning for Disaster: Footholds, Rope Lines, and the Iowa Floods, 2011
BYU L. REV. 2203, 2206 (citing U.S. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH
PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 32 (2009),
available at http://downloads.globalchange.gov/usimpacts/pdfs/climate-impactsreport.pdf.
19. Third National Climate Assessment, supra note 1, at 40. The report notes,
however, that the precise relationship between increasing downpours and river
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The central irony of our efforts to help alleviate the risk of flooding
over the past century is that we have actually made the problem
worse. The goals of disaster policy are twofold: first, preparing for
disasters before they strike so as to mitigate the harms they cause,
and second, helping people recover after a disaster occurs. These
goals are naturally in tension. By attempting to insulate certain
populations from disasters, we have dramatically increased the
number of people exposed to them. Experts call this the “safe
development paradox.” By making development “safe,” flood
control structures actually make people less safe, by encouraging
development in risky areas.20
New Orleans provides a stark example. The neighborhood known
as New Orleans East was basically a vast swamp until the late 60’s.21
When Hurricane Betsy provided the impetus for the construction of a
massive new levee system around New Orleans, the levees were also
designed to encircle then-uninhabited New Orleans East.22 A costbenefit analysis conducted by the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency in 1976 attributed only twenty-one percent of the benefit of
the new levee system to protecting the city of New Orleans as it then
existed. Seventy-nine percent of the project’s benefits were to come
from new development in previously empty areas that would now be
protected.23 Indeed, New Orleans East rapidly became a popular
suburb.24 In the days after Hurricane Katrina, parts of the area were
more than ten feet underwater.25
Not only do flood control devices encourage settlement in areas of
high flood risk by creating an illusion of safety, they can also
flooding is not known, since the largest increases in heavy rains may occur during
the summer and fall, when the ground tends to be drier and more capable of
absorbing rainwater. Id.
20. See Raymond J. Burby, Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of
Government Disaster Policy: Bringing About Wise Governmental Decisions for
Hazardous Areas, 604 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 171, 173
(2006).
21. Id. at 175.
22. Id. at 174 – 75.
23. Id.
24. 22,000 new housing units were built in the area between 1970 and 2000. Id.
at 176.
25. CHRISTINE F. ANDERSON, THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION
SYSTEM: WHAT WENT WRONG AND WHY 32 (2007) (report by American Society
of Civil Engineers Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel).
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exacerbate the risk itself by increasing the severity of the floods they
are supposed to prevent. Wetlands and coastal vegetation act as
natural “sponges” that help soak up storm surges.26 When those
areas are “hardscaped” by development, they no longer perform this
function.27 Development along sandy beaches poses similar risks.
When left alone, beaches and barrier islands migrate as the action of
waves and storms picks up and redistributes sand.28 Towns with
buildings along beaches have often sought to prevent the loss of the
land on which they sit—and its attendant flooding—by building
concrete seawalls, but scientists now know that seawalls only
accelerate the erosion of beaches.29 The only viable option for
keeping such places intact as they currently exist consists of periodic
“beach replenishment,” which involves dredging sand from the ocean
and depositing it along beaches to form large man-made dunes. The
Army Corps of Engineers has erected a twenty-two foot high
protective rampart made of sand to protect one such town, Harvey
Cedars, New Jersey, population 337. The project cost twenty-six
million dollars, of which the town itself paid barely one percent.30
Many dams, particularly on western rivers, were constructed solely
to prevent floods.31 While they often serve that function well for the

26. John Rudolf, et al., Hurricane Sandy Damage Amplified by Breakneck
Development of Coast, The Huffington Post, Nov. 12, 2012,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/12/hurricane-sandydamage_n_2114525.html.
27. Id.
28. John Seabrook, The Beach Builders: Can the Jersey Shore be Saved?, NEW
YORKER, July 22, 2013, at 42, 45; Robert J. Nicholls & Anny Cazenave, Sea-level
Rise and its Impact on Coastal Zones, 328 SCIENCE 1517 (2010).
29. See generally ORRIN H. PILKEY & KATHARINE DIXON WHEELER, THE
CORPS AND THE SHORE (Island Press 1998).
30. The federal government paid about 65% of the cost, while the State paid
just under 35%. Seabrook, supra note 28, at 44. Ironically, takings clause
jurisprudence requires that local governments pay homeowners along the beach —
precisely those who benefit most from the protection of new sand dunes — for the
privilege of blocking the views from the first floors of their homes. See Kate
Zernike, Court Sides with Town on Price of Views Lost to Dune, N.Y. TIMES, July
9, 2013, at A16 (reporting New Jersey appellate court’s decision that value of flood
protection must be considered in determining just compensation for homeowners’
loss of view).
31. See Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 517-26 (1941) (describing
history of reservoirs as flood control measures on tributaries of the Mississippi);
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communities immediately downstream, they also trap silt that would
otherwise flow out to the ocean and contribute to the creation of new
land along the coast. Such dams thus deprive coastal communities of
their naturally-recharging shields against storm surges. Indeed, levee
systems along rivers that prevent seasonal flooding have this same
effect. One study estimated that without the yearly replenishment of
silt that seasonal flooding would naturally provide, coastal Louisiana
was “sinking beneath the Gulf of Mexico at a rate of more than forty
square miles a year.”32 Moreover, by eliminating smaller floodplains
upstream, levees exacerbate flooding downstream, as floodwaters are
shunted along instead of “naturally spread,” “filtered into
underground aquifers,” and “released slowly, as from a sponge.”33
These examples support the growing realization that it will not be
possible to engineer our way out of this problem. Unlike the
Netherlands, the United States does not have the option of building a
single magic-bullet flood control system that is capable of mitigating
the flood risk we face. This kind of solution is neither politically nor
practically possible, as the United States faces risks that are more
dispersed and yet also more intense than those faced by the
Netherlands.34 In the wake of Hurricane Sandy, much attention was
drawn to the longstanding question of whether New York City
should, like London, construct flood control gates at the entrances to
its harbor to block an incoming storm surge. Such a project, it has
been estimated, would cost between $10 and $17 billion, and would
only protect areas inside the gates.35 Outside that zone, a solid
barrier would actually make flooding worse, by as much as 20
percent.36 For now, the idea of a flood gate straddling New York
harbor has been shelved, and the response to Hurricane Sandy has
instead focused on more prosaic measures, like raising the subway’s
MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING
WATER 182-94 (1993) (same).
32. Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Food Insurance Program and
Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 61, 124-25 (1985); see also MARC REISNER, CADILLAC
DESERT 475 (1993).
33. Houck, supra note 32, at 81 (citing Belt, The 1979 Flood and Man’s
Constriction of the Mississippi River, 189 SCIENCE 681 (1975)).
34. See supra note 2.
35. Mireya Navarro, Weighing Sea Barriers as Protection for New York, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at A21.
36. Id.

2015]

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

175

ventilation grates and paying homeowners to move out of vulnerable
homes.37
With rising seas creating an ever-increasing risk of catastrophic
flooding (and even permanent inundation) and large-scale
engineering simply incapable of immunizing coastal residents from
flood risk, many have concluded that encouraging a retreat from the
coast must become a major component of efforts to prepare for
floods.38 After Hurricane Sandy, an op-ed in the New York Times
suggested that the way to “end the cycle of repairing or rebuilding
properties in the path of future storms” was to “begin to retreat from
the ocean’s edge.”39 Where simply moving inland isn’t feasible or is
too costly, homes, businesses, and infrastructure will need to be made
resilient to flooding to one degree or another. Policymakers at all
levels have begun to recognize that our response to escalating flood
risk will necessarily include both relocation and adaptation,
implemented on a largely individual level.40 Indeed, a 2014 study by
the National Research Council found that “[s]trategies that reduce the
consequences of coastal storms, such as hazard zoning, building
elevation, land purchase, and setbacks” (which the study referred to
collectively as “consequence reduction strategies”) have cost-benefit
ratios as high as 1:8, and yet have been neglected by policymakers.
Between 2004 and 2012, the study noted, federal funds set aside for
these strategies represented only five percent of the funds allocated to
disaster relief.41
Accepting the inevitability of permanent changes to our nation’s
coastline leads to a stark realization. If the chief goal of our national
disaster policy is to minimize the risk we face by moving people
away from the coasts, then virtually all our efforts to mitigate flood
37. See Kia Gregory & Marc Santora, Bloomberg Outlines $20 Billion Storm
Protection Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 12, 2013, at A1. Conspicuously absent from
Mayor Bloomberg’s plan was a barrier across the harbor. See NEW YORK CITY
SPECIAL INITIATIVE FOR REBUILDING AND RESILIENCY, A STRONGER, MORE
RESILIENT
NEW
YORK
49,
June
11,
2013,
available
at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/sirr/html/report/report.shtml (discussing downsides of
two possible harbor barrier proposals).
38. See supra note 3.
39. Orrin H. Pilkey, Op-Ed., We Need to Retreat from the Beach, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 2012, at A35.
40. See, e.g., Third National Climate Assessment, supra note 1, at 594-95; NYC
SPECIAL INITIATIVE FOR REBUILDING AND RESILIENCY, supra note 37, at 69 et seq.
41. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 5, 87-89.
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risk begin to seem counterproductive. Every dollar spent helping
prevent floods, helping people survive floods, or even helping
communities rebuild after floods represents a quantum of risk that is
being borne by the federal government and not by people living in
areas of flood risk. Such efforts have provided a massive subsidy to
coastal development, a policy that is literally disastrous.
Some modern critics, surveying this history, have come to view the
National Flood Insurance Program as a prime culprit. By providing
flood insurance at below-market rates to homeowners in flood-prone
areas, the NFIP subsidizes coastal development, helping externalize
the risks homeowners face and thus disguising their magnitude. This
subsidy encourages coastal development by effectively making it
more affordable, putting more people in harm’s way and thus
increasing the magnitude of the damage wrought by floods. This
observation has been a theme of the many and repeated calls for the
elimination of the program.42 On the other hand, even those who
insist most fervently that coastal development is unsustainable do not
suggest that all coastal development be abandoned.43 Living on the
coast to be close to a job might well make sense for some people, and
there are many instances in which the benefits people derive from
living in such areas outweigh the risks, regardless of how those risks
are allocated.
The risk of flooding is a type of externality, one that has
historically been spread onto taxpayers as a whole. In order to
achieve what could be called an efficient outcome (coastal
development occurring only when its benefits outweigh its risks),
property owners, as “least cost avoiders,” must be forced to bear the
costs of the flooding to which they expose themselves.44 As
42. See, e.g., Judith Kildow & Jason Scorse, End Federal Flood Insurance,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 2012, at A31; Charlene Luke & Aviva Abramovsky,
Managing the Next Deluge: A Tax System Approach to Flood Insurance, 18 Conn.
Ins. L.J. 1, 42 et seq. (2011) (proposing replacement of the NFIP with universal
social safety net for flood losses paid for by tax withholding); see also Knowles &
Kunreuther, supra note 4, at 343 (characterizing the moral hazard argument as a
“key critique that has plagued the NFIP”).
43. See Pilkey, supra note 39 (arguing that “surviving buildings and new
construction should be elevated on pilings” and that “some buildings should be
moved back from the beach”).
44. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules
and Inalienability: One view of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1096-97
(1972). It is at least arguable that owners of flood prone property are not always
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discussed in more detail below, spreading this risk prevents this
decision from being made, as it masks the costs of flooding from
those who have some ability to decide whether they live in a flood
zone or not. There is a simpler way of putting the problem.
Artificially low flood insurance premiums essentially trick people
into thinking that living on the coast is safer than it is. Research has
shown that people are bad at evaluating risks that are highly unlikely
and yet catastrophic if they occur.45 Flood insurance premiums serve
a messaging function: someone has quantified the risk you face for
you, and this figure approximates its gravity. When that figure is
artificially low, people are being told that their situation is less risky
than it actually is.
The NFIP is a preexisting mechanism for compelling homeowners
in areas of high flood risk to recognize and bear some of the cost of
the risk they face, even if its premiums have been set at artificially
low levels. Far from being ripe for outright abolition, the NFIP
actually has the potential to be a potent weapon in the struggle to
limit and discourage development that puts people in the way of
floods. The NFIP has always had features that were aimed at
minimizing flood risk. Its ineffectiveness, and its historical status as
an ill-advised subsidy to coastal development, could be corrected by
implementing an individual mandate requiring all homeowners in
flood zones to participate in the program. With this modification,
and with premiums adjusted upwards, the NFIP could play a crucial
role in performing the delicate balancing act required by disaster
preparation. The program would thus be able to achieve its goal of
properly considered the least cost avoiders when it comes to their exposure to flood
risk. For instance, it may not be reasonable to expect that someone who was born
and raised in a flood-prone neighborhood of New Orleans has the means to relocate
out of concern for the area’s flood risk, even if that person is a homeowner. See
infra note 185. Moreover, because flood risks are highly correlated, focusing on an
individual property owner may provide a misleading answer to the question of who
is able to prevent the harm of flooding at least cost. In the case of many
communities, it may well be that government can mitigate the risk of flooding
through engineering at less cost than the individuals within that community would
incur, collectively, by moving out or paying for their homes to be elevated. A
representative government should, however, be responsive to the flood risk of its
people (as manifested in the collective burden of flood insurance premiums), and
there are reasons to think that mandating coverage would increase this
responsiveness. See infra notes 209-211.
45. See infra Part IV.D.1.
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helping protect people from crippling losses while at the same time
discouraging irresponsible development.
III. THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM
The roots of the NFIP can be traced back at least as far as 1927,
when the Mississippi River burst its banks and flooded
approximately 26,000 square miles, killing more than 200 people,
displacing 600,000 others, and causing roughly $5 billion in property
damage.46 Insurers, who at the time provided flood insurance,
suffered staggering losses in the 1927 floods due to a characteristic of
flood risk called “correlation.”47 When risks are not correlated, the
risk of a harm befalling a particular individual (or policyholder) is
unrelated to the risk that another individual will suffer the same
harm. For instance, the risk that anyone will suffer a heart attack in a
given day is not correlated with the risk that his or her neighbor will
suffer a heart attack that same day. Flood risk is quite different. As
insurers learned in 1927, the risk that a particular home will be
destroyed by a flood is highly correlated with the risk that
neighboring homes – and thousands of others – will be destroyed at
the same time. Thus, even though there might be only a one percent
chance of a flood in a given year, when that flood occurs it is likely
to affect thousands of properties at the same time.48 This feature of
46. Houck, supra note 32, at n.98. The flood is estimated to have cost
$364,533,154 in damage in 1927 dollars. Id. The figure above was updated using
the inflation calculator on the website of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. See CPI
Inflation
Calculator,
BUREAU
OF
LABOR
STATISTICS,
www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm. See also Adam F. Scales, A Nation of
Policyholders: Governmental and Market Failure in Flood Insurance, 26 MISS. C.
L. REV. 3, 7 (2006).
47. Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 42, at 23-24 (citing DAVID A. MOSS,
WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER 262
(2002)); see also James Ming Chen, Correlation, Coverage, and Catastrophe: The
Contours of Financial Preparedness for Disaster, 26 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 56,
65-66 (2014) (referring to correlation as “the most insidious factor undermining the
financial integrity of private insurance for catastrophic risk”).
48. Id.; Scales, supra note 46, at 10-11. Luke and Abramovsky note that private
insurance companies would address this problem by charging “front-loaded
premiums to create a large reserve in case the low probability event occurred early
in the life of the risk pool,” which has the effect of making flood insurance less
attractive to individuals. Supra note 42, at 23-24. Another tactic insurance
companies have adopted to combat highly correlated risks is establishing an array

2015]

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

179

flood risk is what makes it so difficult for private insurers to spread
the risk evenly across their policyholders, and a major part of the
reason private insurers had simply stopped providing flood insurance
by the mid 20th century.49
Into this void stepped the federal government. The move toward
the creation of a national flood insurance program proceeded in fits
and starts until 1968, when Congress passed the National Flood
Insurance Act, which created the NFIP.50 The NFIP is administered
by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) and
provides flood insurance to those who live in certain areas. Among
the program’s complex provisions are features that encourage those
who participate to reduce their flood risk and that link the amount of
premiums property owners must pay to the riskiness of their
situations. Crucially, however, most NFIP policyholders pay
subsidized rates, and the program lacks an individual mandate.
These two factors contribute to the program’s financial troubles and
hamper its ability to reduce the nation’s flood risk, even while it
helps insulate individuals from the financial costs of particular
floods.
This Part describes the NFIP in some detail and examines the
various ways in which its provisions have fallen short of their
intended goals. Parts III.A, III.B, and III.C discuss the three key
features of the NFIP: flood risk evaluation, mitigation, and
of subsidiaries that issue policies in narrow geographic areas. When large losses
occur, these subsidiaries are simply allowed to go bankrupt without affecting the
exposure of the parent corporation. Scales, supra note 46, at 11. This practice has,
needless to say, been controversial. Id. at n.29.
49. Between 1952 and 1955, after massive floods in Kansas and Missouri, the
insurance industry published a series of reports concluding that flood insurance
could not be successfully underwritten by private insurers. AM. INS. ASS’N.,
STUDIES OF FLOODS AND FLOOD DAMAGE 1952-1955, at 3 (1956), cited in, Wesse
& Ooms, The National Flood Insurance Program—Did the Insurance Industry
Drop Out?, 31 CHARTERED PROPERTY AND CASUALTY UNDERWRITERS J. 187 n.5
(1978).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 4011 et seq. (2012); Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 572.
Hurricane Betsy struck the Gulf Coast in 1965, prompting Congress to pass the
Southeast Hurricane Disaster Relief Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-339, 79 Stat.
1301, which directed the Department of Housing and Urban Development to
prepare a report on the feasibility of a comprehensive approach to compensation for
flood victims. The resulting report, which was submitted to Congress in 1966,
recommended the creation of a national flood insurance program, among other
measures. Houck, supra note 32, at 68-69.
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insurance.51 Part III.D discusses the NFIP’s longstanding lack of
financial soundness. Part III.E reviews recent efforts to reform the
NFIP, particularly the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act
of 2012 and the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of
2014. Finally, Part III.F examines the limited mechanism by which
the NFIP requires certain property owners to purchase flood
insurance and the failures in this mechanism. As will be shown, the
NFIP is a tool for shifting risk, one that, if properly calibrated, could
do much to help encourage more rational development in flood-prone
areas while also aiding the swift and predictable recovery from
disasters.
A. Evaluating the Risk
The NFIP first tasks FEMA with evaluating the flood risk faced by
essentially every property in the country.52 This involves a two step
analysis. First, FEMA identifies what it calls “special flood hazard
areas,” which are areas that have a 1 percent chance of experiencing a
flood in any given year.53 This statistical construct – the flood with a
1 percent chance of occurring in any given year, also known as a
“100-year flood” – is the foundation on which much of the NFIP is
built.54 Special flood hazard areas, or “100-year flood zones,” are
51. The NFIP has been tweaked by legislation many times over the course of its
existence. The details of this evolution are outside the scope of this Article, and are
well chronicled elsewhere. See, e.g., Knowles & Kunreuther, supra note 4;
HOWARD KUNREUTHER & DOUGLAS C. DACY, THE ECONOMICS OF NATURAL
DISASTERS 259 (1969); Beth Davison, Note: How Quickly We Forget: The
National Flood Insurance Program and Floodplain Development in Missouri, 19
WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 365, 366-69 (2005).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 4101. Reliably predicting the flood risk of an individual
property requires complex hydrological studies and was another key barrier private
insurers faced in attempting to provide flood insurance. Edward T. Pasterick, The
National Flood Insurance Program, in PAYING THE PRICE: THE STATUS AND ROLE
OF INSURANCE AGAINST NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE UNITED STATES 125, 128
(Howard Kunreuther and Richard Roth, eds. 1998); Scales, supra note 46, at 8.
53. 44 C.F.R. § 59.1 (2014); Houck, supra note 32, at 74. FEMA refers to
floods that have a 1 percent chance of occurring in a given year as “base floods,”
and to the height of the water during such floods as the “base flood elevation.” 44
C.F.R. § 59.1.
54. The term “100-year flood” is somewhat misleading, as it is often mistakenly
assumed that such a flood will occur only once in each hundred year period.
Because floods do not occur at regular intervals, however, the occurrence of one
100-year flood says nothing about when the next will arrive. See Scales, supra
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depicted on a rough preliminary map called a “Flood Hazard
Boundary Map,” which typically shows only the outline of the
special flood hazard area, marked as “Zone A.”55 At this stage, with
only the Flood Hazard Boundary Map complete, only limited “first
layer coverage” is available.56 The idea is that a participating
community will proceed from this “emergency phase” to the “regular
program” as rapidly as possible (which has, indeed, already happened
for the vast majority of participating communities).57
Before a community can transition from the emergency program to
the regular program, FEMA must complete a “flood insurance rate
study,” a comprehensive examination of the area’s flood risks that
results in a “flood insurance rate map,” commonly referred to as a
“FIRM.”58 In addition to showing areas of minimal, moderate, and
special flood hazard, a FIRM provides detailed information about
how severe flooding is likely to be in the event of a 100-year flood.
The series of symbols used by FEMA to mark areas of varying
hazard give some sense of how complex a FIRM can be. Within
Zone A (areas that will be inundated during a 100-year flood), a
FIRM can use the symbol A0 to denote an area of “shallow water
depths and/or unpredictable flow paths between 1 and 3 feet” and the
symbols A1 to A30 to denote the depth of the water in an area at
“base flood elevation,” which is the water level during a 100-year
flood.59 The maps also take into account flood protection systems
that might keep an otherwise flood-prone area dry: the code A99
denotes an “area of special flood hazard where enough progress has
been made on a protective system . . . to consider it complete for
note 46, at 9, n.23 (“What the average person actually understands . . . is that once
there has already been such a flood in his area, he is safe for the next ninety-nine
years.”). FEMA now prefers to express the chance of flooding by telling
homeowners in 100-year flood zones that they face a twenty-five percent chance of
flooding at least once over the course of a 30-year mortgage. See FloodSmart.gov:
The official site of the NFIP, About the National Flood Insurance Program: When
insurance is required, www.floodsmart.gov/pages/about/when_insurance_is_
required.jsp; see also National Research Council, supra note 5, at 21 (noting that
“[i]n recent years the trend has been to call this the ‘1 percent chance’ event, to
emphasize that the event could happen at any time”).
55. 44 C.F.R. § 64.3(a)(2); Houck, supra note 32, at 74.
56. 44 C.F.R. §§ 59.1, 59.3.
57. Id. at § 59.3; Houck, supra note 32, at 76.
58. 44 C.F.R. §§ 59.1, 60.3(e).
59. Id. § 64.3(a)(1).
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insurance rating purposes,” while the code AR denotes an area of
flood hazard resulting from “the decertification of a previously
accredited flood protection system that is determined to be in the
process of being restored to provide base flood protection.”60 A
FIRM may also use codes ranging from V or V0 to V30 to denote
“coastal high hazard areas” where flood waters might have velocity
(giving them much more destructive potential).61 Finally, there are
special codes to indicate varying degrees of mudslide risk, erosion
hazards, and “undetermined but possible flood hazards.”62 In
essence, the key feature of the FIRM is that it depicts the difference
between a given property’s surface elevation and the base flood
elevation, and thus gives a sense of how many feet of water will
cover the property in the event of a statistically average 100-year
flood.63
B. Mitigating the Risk
Participation in the NFIP is community-based: flood insurance is
only available to those who live in communities that participate in the
program.64 The program thus holds out an incentive to communities
to participate in offering flood insurance to their residents, but it also
carries a threat. In non-participating communities, federal grants,
60. Id. Notably, however, there is no provision by which a FIRM (or, as a
result, an individual’s flood insurance premiums) can take into account the
likelihood that a levee will fail. See Burby, supra note 20, at 177. New Orleans is
far from the only example. In 1987, FEMA estimated that approximately one-third
of all flood disasters involved levee overtopping or failure. Id. at 176.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Houck, supra note 32, at 77, n.84. One study conducted by FEMA
estimated that roughly 3 percent of the U.S. population lives in coastal special
flood hazard areas. Mark Crowell, et al., An Estimate of the U.S. Population Living
in 100-Year Coastal Flood Hazard Areas, 26 J. OF COASTAL RESEARCH 201, 201
(2010).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 4102(c). The regulations define “community” as any political
subdivision “with the authority to adopt and enforce flood plain management
regulations for the areas within its jurisdiction.” 44 C.F.R. § 59.1. Individuals in
non-participating communities must rely on post-hoc government assistance or on
private flood insurance, which is virtually non-existent. Luke & Abramovsky,
supra note 42, at 8 n.31. This is a rare situation: “most flood-prone communities
that have elected not to participate are communities whose areas of serious flood
risk are either very small or have few if any structures.” Pasterick, supra note 52,
at 129.
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disaster relief, and mortgage insurance are not available for
properties located in special flood hazard areas.65 To participate, a
community must enact certain measures to help mitigate its flood
risk.66 The requirements vary depending on whether a community is
flood-prone, mudslide prone, subject to flood-related erosion, or
some combination of these, and also increase in stages depending on
the level of detail at which the area’s flood risks have been mapped.67
Most importantly, the regulations require that a community preapprove new construction in flood-prone areas and that it do so only
where the new development is designed to be flood-resistant in
various ways.68 For instance, new construction in 100-year flood
zones must be “designed (or modified) and adequately anchored to
prevent flotation, collapse, or lateral movement of the structure” due
to flooding and must be built with materials that are “resistant to
flood damage.”69 When a FIRM shows an area’s base flood
elevation, all new construction and “substantial improvements of
residential structures” that occurs in special flood hazard areas after
the FIRM is issued must be elevated above the base flood level.70
The NFIP also requires that communities avoid development that will
have the effect of worsening floods, such as development that would
block stormwater drainage.71 Such are the requirements that apply to
all communities that participate in the NFIP.
Just how effective these requirements have been in helping to
mitigate flood damage is a matter of debate. Their most notable
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

42 U.S.C. § 4106; Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 42, at 8.
42 U.S.C. §§ 4022, 4102(c); 44 C.F.R. § 59.22(a)(3).
44 C.F.R. §§ 60.2, 60.3.
Id. § 60.3(a)(3).
Id. § 60.3(b).
Id. § 60.3(c)(2). The regulations define “substantial improvements” to mean
improvements that cost 50 percent or more of the structure’s market value (when a
structure has been damaged by flooding, its market value is its pre-flood value). Id.
§ 59.1. During the rebuilding of New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina,
many residents thus found that determinations of the amount of damage their
homes had suffered carried dramatic consequences. Homes that were more than
50% damaged were required to be elevated above the base flood level, sometimes
ten or fifteen feet above street level. See, e.g., Renee Peck, Elevated Houses
Making a Mark on Post-Katrina New Orleans Landscape, NEW ORLEANS TIMESPICAYUNE, Aug. 23, 2008; Adam Nossiter, Rebuilding New Orleans, One Appeal
at a Time, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006.
71. 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(c)(10).
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feature is that they are entirely decentralized. Rather than simply
imposing regulations on everyone, the NFIP places the burden of
establishing and enforcing these rules on individual communities.
These requirements are in turn enforced by FEMA, which conducts
reviews periodically to ensure that participating communities are in
compliance.72 If FEMA determines that a community is not
complying, it can be placed on probation and ultimately suspended
from the program, which renders the community’s residents
ineligible for coverage.73 FEMA performs site visits, however, at a
relatively small percentage of participating communities each year,
and most of the information it receives about compliance comes in
the form of annual reports from the communities themselves.74
Studies conducted over the years by academics, consultants, and
FEMA itself have suggested that these enforcement mechanisms are
not terribly effective. One survey of a variety of communities in
Louisiana revealed numerous instances in which communities fell far
short of meeting their regulatory mandate.75 In one flood-prone
community, local officials made “little or no effort to enforce the
[NFIP’s] flood plain management and elevation requirements.”76 In
another, a FEMA investigation concluded that local officials
exhibited a “total lack of understanding” of the NFIP’s
requirements.77 Another study attributed a quarter of the $16 billion
in losses caused by Hurricane Andrew in 1992 to Dade County’s
failure to enforce its own building code.78 The federal government
has sued such communities, on the theory that their flagrant
violations of the NFIP’s requirements amount to a breach of contract,
but these suits have not been successful.79 Individuals have also sued
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Pasterick, supra note 52, at 131.
Id.; 44 C.F.R. § 59.24.
Houck, supra note 32, at 91-92.
See generally, Houck, supra note 32, at 91-114.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 99.
Burby, supra note 20, at 178.
See United States v. St. Bernard Parish, 756 F.2d 1116, 1118-19 (5th Cir.
1985) (affirming dismissal of contractual claim and further holding that no implied
right of action is available to the United States under the NFIP). While it
foreclosed the possibility of breach of contract suits against municipalities, the
Fifth Circuit in United States v. St. Bernard Parish left open the possibility of a
subrogation suit, in which an insurer pays its insured and then sues an entity it
claims caused the losses. See id. at 1128. Nevertheless, the federal government
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their communities for their failure to comply with NFIP requirements
on a tort theory, but these suits have similarly failed.80
It is also worth noting that the regulations do not require
communities to restrict, let alone forbid, new construction in floodprone areas.81 Only by requiring that new structures be raised above
base flood elevation do the regulations arguably impose an additional
marginal cost on floodplain development, and this cost may well be
outweighed by the availability of insurance to cover flood losses.
Nevertheless, complying with the NFIP’s regulations does appear to
help mitigate flood damage. One analysis of losses from 1978 to
1994 showed that structures built before 1975, when the NFIP’s base
flood elevation rules went into effect, suffered about six times more
damage than those built after 1975.82 Another report, by the
Interagency Floodplain Management Review Committee, found, in
studying the 1993 flooding in the Midwest, that many communities
there “actively discourage floodplain development” thanks to the
increased costs associated with the NFIP’s floodplain management
requirements.83
As an additional incentive to help mitigate flood risks, the NFIP
has also contained, since 1990, an optional, more burdensome set of
requirements that communities can elect to implement in exchange
for lower premiums. This is known as the Community Rating
has not enjoyed success in pursuing such claims. See Wesley Davis, Lessons
Learned from the Flood Insurance ReMapping Controversy in Portland, Maine, 16
OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 181, 203-04 (2010) (citing Gabler v. Regent Dev. Corp.,
470 So. 2d 149, 162 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1985) (holding that proximate cause of
losses was an “act of God”)).
80. See Gabler, 470 So. 2d at 162 (dismissing suit on the grounds that the
damage was caused by “an act of God”); see also Timothy Kozlowski, Dams and
Levees are Not Enough: The Case for Recognizing a Cause of Action Against NonComplying NFIP Communities, 32 WM. & MARY ENVT’L L. & POL’Y REV. 245
(2007).
81. See St. Amand, supra note 3, at 20.
82. Pasterick, supra note 52, at 132. There may of course be other reasons for
this discrepancy. For instance, structures built since 1975 are by definition newer,
and may simply be in better repair than older structures. It may also be that newer
structures are less likely to be located in flood plains for reasons having nothing to
do with the NFIP, for instance because rivers are no longer the commercial hearts
of most cities.
83. Id. (citing INTERAGENCY FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE,
SHARING THE CHALLENGE: FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT INTO THE 21ST CENTURY 97
(1994)).
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System.84
Under the Community Rating System (“CRS”),
communities are classified on a ten-point scale based on the number
of points they earn for taking certain flood mitigation measures in
pursuit of the CRS’s goals. A class 10 community does nothing
beyond what the NFIP requires and receives no discount on
premiums, while a class 1 community must earn more than 4,500
points and is entitled to a 45 percent discount on premiums for
properties within a special flood hazard area and a 10 percent
discount on premiums for properties not in a special flood hazard
area.85
The CRS lays out nineteen activities in four basic categories for
which communities can earn points: (1) public information activities,
which rewards communities that “advise people about the flood
hazard, encourage the purchase of flood insurance, and provide
information about ways to reduce flood damage;” (2) mapping and
regulations, which rewards communities for, among other things,
“preserving open space, protecting natural floodplain functions,
enforcing higher regulatory standards, and managing stormwater;”
(3) flood damage reduction activities, which rewards communities
for “relocating or retrofitting flood-prone structures and maintaining
drainage systems;” and finally, (4) “warning and response,” under
which communities are rewarded for creating “flood warning and
response programs.”86 For each of the nineteen activities that fall
into these four groups, the CRS Coordinator’s Manual establishes a
maximum number of points that can be earned. Notably, the most
valuable activities in terms of possible points are “open space
84. 42 U.S.C. § 4022(b) (authorizing the creation of the Community Rating
System). The provisions of the Community Rating System itself are laid out in a
614-page FEMA publication called THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM
COMMUNITY RATING SYSTEM COORDINATOR’S MANUAL (2013) [hereinafter CRS
Coordinator’s
Manual],
available
at
http://www.fema.gov/medialibrary/assets/documents/8768. Interestingly, the cover of the Manual features a
photograph of a flooded bucolic landscape with a green lawn and a park bench in
the foreground. The manual explains that this photograph represents “the ultimate
floodplain, from a community’s perspective: Nature follows its course with no
threat to life or property. The waterfront is a community asset where people can
relax and enjoy the view.” Id. at ii. This attitude reflects the CRS’s broader
institutional goal of moving people out of floodplains rather than attempting to
insulate them from the risks of flooding.
85. CRS Coordinator’s Manual, supra note 84, at 110-13.
86. Id. at 110-14.
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regulation” and “higher regulatory standards,” followed by
“acquisition and relocation” and “flood protection.”87
According to FEMA, there are 1,200 communities in the
Community Rating System, of which only one, Roseville, California,
has attained a Class 1 rating.88 Indeed, only about 70 of the 1,200
participating communities have a rating of Class 5 or better.89 While
these numbers may sound low, they represent real progress. As of
1998, there were 912 communities participating in the CRS, of which
only two had reached Class 5.90 The 1,200 communities in the
Community Rating System today represent only 5 percent of the total
number of communities that participate in the NFIP, but in this five
percent of communities live approximately 67 percent of NFIP
policyholders.91 These figures stand in marked contrast to the status
quo that existed before the creation of the NFIP, when a 1958 study
showed that “virtually no local governments in the United States had
adopted building or zoning regulations to minimize flood losses.”92
The substantial discounts available under the Community Rating
System thus provide a very real incentive for communities to
undertake various additional burdens in their efforts to mitigate flood
risk. Whether these measures have led to a meaningful reduction in
losses due to flooding is an open question.
C. Insuring Against the Risk
Once a community elects to participate in the NFIP, its residents
become eligible to purchase flood insurance. The NFIP’s provision
of flood insurance at subsidized rates is the most controversial aspect
of the program, and the source of the majority of its woes. It is also,
however, an aspect of the program that is often oversimplified and
misunderstood.
The popular impression is that all NFIP

87. Id. at 110-16.
88. About CRS, FLOODSMART.GOV, http://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/

pages/crs/community_rating_system.jsp (last updated Dec. 16, 2014).
89. Id.
90. Pasterick, supra note 52, at 137.
91. See Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 42, at 9. Of course, as will be
discussed below, the mere fact of a community’s participation does not mean that
every property owner in the community has flood insurance.
92. Burby, supra note 20, at 178 (citing Francis C. Murphy, Regulating Flood
Plain Development, U. Chi. Dep’t of Geography Research Paper No. 56 (1958)).
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policyholders are paying subsidized rates.93 This is simply not true.
In reality, the NFIP mandates that actuarial rates be charged in most
instances.94 Biggert-Waters eliminated some of the exceptions to this
rule, generating a dramatic response that led to the passage of the
Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014.
In
evaluating the viability and mechanics of the NFIP, it is useful to
examine the details of how premiums are calculated.
The NFIP creates two basic categories of premiums: “risk premium
rates,” also known as “actuarial rates,” and “chargeable rates,” often
referred to as “subsidized rates.”95 Actuarial rates are supposed to be
actuarially sound in the sense that they are reflective of the risk faced
by each property, plus the operating costs and expenses necessary to
ensure that the program breaks even.96 Chargeable rates, in contrast,
are designed to be lower than actuarial rates, and are set at a level
that “can reasonably be charged to insureds in order to encourage
them to purchase” flood insurance.97 Before the passage of BiggertWaters, chargeable rates applied to all properties located within the
100-year flood zone that were constructed before the issuance of a
FIRM (regardless of when either the policy or the property itself was
purchased), as well as properties in the “emergency program,” the
temporary bridge program that exists until a FIRM is issued.98
Finally, a longstanding provision capped increases in rates at no more
than 10 percent per year.99

93. See, e.g., Kildow & Scorse, supra note 42 (“It is long past time for the
government to stop subsidizing home and business owners who live and build in
dangerous flood zones”).
94. The tendency to refer in sweeping language to all federal flood insurance as
subsidized seems to stem from the fact that there is no private market for flood
insurance, suggesting that it is simply too expensive to be provided at market rates.
In actuality, the private market for flood insurance died due primarily to the dual
problems of correlation and the difficulty of accurately evaluating the flood risk
faced by individual properties. See supra notes 47–49, 52.
95. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4014, 4015; 44 C.F.R. § 59.1.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 4014(a)(1); 44 C.F.R. §§ 59.1, 61.7(a).
97. 44 C.F.R. § 61.7(b); 42 U.S.C. § 4015(b)(2). In practice, the chargeable
rates that have been used are estimated to be about 38 percent of the actuarial rate
that would reflect the full measure of risk faced by a particular property. Pasterick,
supra note 52, at 134.
98. 44 C.F.R. § 61.9; see infra Part III.E.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 4015(e).
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It is worth noting that the law does not mandate that particular
rates be charged; these decisions are left to the discretion of FEMA.
As the NFIP has evolved, FEMA’s view of what constitutes a
“chargeable rate” has shifted. In the 1970s the main objective was to
encourage participation in the NFIP, and chargeable rates were quite
low.100 In the 80s and 90s these rates were increased, with the aim of
making the NFIP more financially sound.101 The percentage of
properties paying chargeable rates has simultaneously decreased,
going from about 75 percent in 1978 to about 35 percent in 1997.102
D. The NFIP’s Financial Troubles
Of course, even though most policyholders do not pay subsidized
rates, the NFIP itself is “subsidized” in various ways. The subsidy
provided to pre-FIRM properties located in a 100-year flood zone in
the form of an artificially low “chargeable rate” has long been a
source of controversy, and is widely seen as a major contributor to
the NFIP’s infamous financial problems.103 As of 2010, the GAO
estimated that about 22 percent of all NFIP policyholders paid
subsidized rates, which were about 35 to 40 percent of what their
actuarial rates would be.104 According to FEMA, properties paying
subsidized rates, which were entitled to do so because they are
located in 100-year flood zones but pre-date the issuance of a FIRM
(which triggers the NFIP’s design regulations), experience as much
as five times more flood damage than new structures paying actuarial
rates.105 In addition to the subsidized, “chargeable” rates created by

100.
101.
102.
103.

Pasterick, supra note 52, at 134.
Id.
Id.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE
PROGRAM: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS FINANCIAL AND
OPERATIONAL ISSUES 4 (2010) (testimony before congress) [hereinafter GAO,
Continued Actions]; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-12,
FLOOD INSURANCE: FEMA’S RATE-SETTING PROCESS WARRANTS ATTENTION
(2008); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FLOOD INSURANCE: OPTIONS FOR
ADDRESSING THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF SUBSIDIZED PREMIUM RATES ON THE
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM, GAO-09-20 (2008).
104. GAO, Continued Actions, at 6.
105. Id. In a way, this figure is an indication of the success of the mitigation
requirements the NFIP imposes on post-FIRM properties in 100-year flood zones.
Another, more optimistic, way of framing the issue is to observe that properties
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statute, FEMA has allowed certain properties that have been
remapped into riskier flood zones to continue paying their old,
“grandfathered” rates, creating another set of policyholders who pay
less than their actuarial cost.106
There are, in addition, myriad other factors that have contributed to
the program’s financial shortfalls. One of the most frequently cited is
the so-called “repetitive loss problem,” which is based on the
observation that certain properties account for a wildly
disproportionate share of the NFIP’s expenses. Repetitive loss
properties, which are properties that have had two or more flood
insurance claims of $10,000 or more in ten years, account for about 1
percent of policies but 30 percent of the program’s losses.107 Despite
attempts by Congress to mitigate this problem, it remains a major
financial drag on the NFIP.108
There is also the ongoing difficulty of accurately quantifying the
risk faced by policyholders. Some have suggested that the
methodology the NFIP uses to measure risk is fundamentally flawed.
As has been seen, much hinges on the use, as a statistical benchmark,
of a flood that has a one percent chance of occurring in any given
year. Category 3, 4, and 5 hurricanes are excluded from the
program’s basic benchmark of risk, since they are too statistically
unlikely to qualify as 100-year floods.109 Areas that would flood
during such storms, but not during a 100-year flood, are thus not
constructed in flood plains that are subject to the NFIP’s mitigation requirements
experience far less flood damage than their pre-FIRM neighbors.
106. Id. at 7.
107. Id. A number of these properties also receive subsidized rates, heightening
their deleterious fiscal impact. Id. In one example cited by the New York Times, a
home in Biloxi, Mississippi that was worth $183,000 flooded 15 times in the course
of a decade, receiving flood insurance payments totaling $1.47 million. Eric
Lipton, Felicity Barringer, & Mary Williams Walsh, Federal Flood Insurance
Program, Already Fragile, Faces New Stress, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2012, at A1.
108. See The Bunning-Bereuter-Blumenauer Flood Insurance Reform Act of
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-264 § 2, 118 Stat. 712, 713. The 2004 Act provided funding
for States or communities to undertake efforts to reduce the risk posed by repetitive
loss properties. These measures included elevation, relocation, demolition, and
floodproofing. Id. § 102, 118 Stat. 715. The act also included a provision
increasing the premiums for owners of repetitive loss properties who refused an
offer of mitigation. Id. § 102(h), 118 Stat. 717. Nevertheless, the GAO noted in
2010 that despite these efforts, “the number of repetitive loss properties has
continued to grow.” GAO, Continued Actions, supra note 103, at 8.
109. Burby, supra note 20, at 177.
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considered to be “special flood hazard areas” under the NFIP.110 It
has been suggested that using a more conservative benchmark, such
as the 500-year flood, would be more appropriate.111 FEMA was
also historically prevented from taking into account long-term
erosion resulting from climate change and rising sea levels in
updating flood maps and setting premium rates.112
The net result of the NFIP’s various financial shortcomings has
been enormous debt. The program is statutorily entitled to ask the
Treasury for loans when it experiences shortfalls,113 and it has made
liberal use of this privilege. As of November 2012, just after
Hurricane Sandy struck the East Coast, FEMA owed the Treasury
roughly $20 billion, and had not repaid any principal on its
outstanding debt since 2010.114 In January 2013, Congress increased
the NFIP’s borrowing authority to $30.4 billion after it became clear
that the program would have to take on more debt to pay claims from
Hurricane Sandy.115 The NFIP’s losses, the GAO has found, have
created “substantial financial exposure for the federal government
and U.S. taxpayers,” landing the program a spot on the GAO’s “high
risk list,” where it has remained since 2006.116
Indeed, the degree to which the NFIP is actuarially unsound, and
the degree to which flood losses are being borne by American
taxpayers generally rather than NFIP policyholders in the form of
premiums, is nicely represented by the size of the NFIP’s debt to the
110. See supra note 53.
111. See Burby, supra note 20, at 177 (describing proposal by the Association of

State Floodplain Managers). Indeed, NFIP claims in 2005, which resulted
primarily from Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, totaled $17.7 billion. Lipton,
et al., supra note 107, at A1.
112. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-283, HIGH-RISK SERIES:
AN UPDATE 263 (2013) [hereinafter GAO, High-Risk Series]. Another feature of
the NFIP that has drawn attention is its inability to purchase reinsurance, which is
particularly important to private insurers in protecting against catastrophic risks.
GAO, Continued Actions, supra note 103, at 5.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 4016.
114. GAO, High-Risk Series, supra note 106, at 261.
115. See id.; see also Lipton, et al., supra note 112, at A1 (reporting that
payments associated with Hurricane Sandy were expected to reach $7 billion, while
the NFIP could not at that time borrow more than another $3 billion). In the fall of
2012, the interest payments on the NFIP’s debt to the treasury alone ranged from
$90 to $750 million per year, depending on interest rates. Id.
116. GAO, High-Risk Series, supra note 112, at 261.
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treasury. The NFIP has historically created a net flow of money from
taxpayers to policyholders, effectively subsidizing owners of floodprone property by artificially reducing the magnitude of the risk they
bear. This subsidy artificially decreases the costs of flood-prone
development, encouraging the very behavior the NFIP’s mitigation
provisions are meant to prevent.
E. Efforts at Reform: Biggert-Waters and its Fate
Congress took a major stab at solving some of the NFIP’s financial
problems in the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012
(“Biggert-Waters”), which eliminated subsidized premiums for
certain categories of policyholders.117 The law mandated that
actuarial rates be charged to (1) second homes, (2) a broad category
of repetitive loss properties, (3) businesses, and (4) any properties
that undergo substantial flood damage or improvements after the
act’s enactment.118 Biggert-Waters also eliminated subsidized rates
for newly purchased properties and newly purchased policies, as well
as policies reinstated after having lapsed.119 The practice of
“grandfathering” old rates was also eliminated by Biggert-Waters.
Where previously a homeowner could continue paying a
grandfathered rate even if a FIRM was revised to show that his or her
property faced a higher risk, such properties would now be required
to pay the full actuarial rate as shown on the newly revised map.120
The final change that Biggert-Waters effected in the calculation of
rates was an increase in the cap on annual rate increases, from 10 to
20 percent (and to 25 percent for repetitive loss properties).121
117. Biggert-Waters Flood Ins. Reform Act of 2012, § 100205, Pub. L. No. 112141, Title II, 126 Stat. 916 (July 6, 2012) [hereinafter Biggert-Waters]. The bill
enjoyed support from both fiscal conservatives, concerned by the NFIP’s drain on
taxpayers, and environmentalists, who saw higher flood insurance premiums as
reflective of the true costs of climate change.
118. Id. § 100205(a)(1)(A). Repetitive loss properties were defined as before,
but a new catchall provision was added removing subsidized rates for any property
“that has incurred flood-related damage in which the cumulative amounts of
payments under this title equaled or exceeded the fair market value of such
property.” Id.
119. Id. § 100205(a)(1)(B).
120. Id. § 100207.
121. Id. § 100205(c). Biggert-Waters also contained a provision emphasizing
that a flood insurance policy purchased from a private insurer (rather than from the
NFIP) could satisfy the lender mandate, provided it met certain technical
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Thus, after Biggert-Waters, the only policies for which subsidized
rates would continue to apply indefinitely were for pre-FIRM
primary residences in 100-year flood zones, so long as the property
was not sold or substantially improved, did not incur repetitive flood
losses, and the policy was not allowed to lapse. The elimination of
grandfathered rates also meant that Biggert-Waters had a profound
impact on many post-FIRM properties. Even though these had
nominally been subject to actuarial rates rather than subsidized rates,
their rates in many cases were based on old FIRMs and so were much
lower than the actuarial rates required by current estimates of the risk
they faced. Under Biggert-Waters, these rates were set to rise as
well.
Many of the changes wrought by Biggert-Waters went into effect
on October 1, 2013, and as its impact began to be felt, a tide of
political opposition rose. Homeowners in many areas received
notices informing them that their premium payments would be
increasing, often dramatically.122 In many examples cited in the
media, premiums went from being a relatively minor part of a
homeowner’s financial life to a major expense rivaling or even
exceeding the cost of mortgage payments.123 People who had lived
in their homes for decades, particularly those in post-FIRM structures
who had been paying grandfathered rates, suddenly found themselves
unable to afford their flood insurance payments. The increased
premiums also began to drive down real estate prices in certain areas,
since the sale of a pre-FIRM building would trigger new premiums at
actuarial rates.124 Flood insurance “reform,” which in this case meant

requirements. Id. § 100239(a)(4), 126 Stat. 959. Legislation to relax these
requirements has recently been proposed, seeking to “clarify that any private flood
insurance policy accepted by a State” satisfies the lender mandate. Flood Insurance
Market Parity and Modernization Act of 2014, S. 2381, 113th Cong. 2d Sess.
(2014).
122. See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez & Campbell Robertson, Cost of Flood Insurance
Rises, Along with Worries N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2013, at A14.
123. See, e.g., Coral Davenport, Popular Flood Insurance Law is Target of Both
Parties, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2014, at A14 (“Diane Mazzuca . . . had been paying
$595 annually for flood insurance on her $90,000 home. After Biggert-Waters
ended federal flood insurance subsidies last June, she got an updated bill — for
$4,492”).
124. Alvarez & Robertson, supra note 122 (reporting that in some areas “home
sales have come to a near standstill”). The Times also reported that sellers were
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undoing reforms barely a year old, quickly became a salient political
issue in places like Louisiana, and a grassroots anti-Biggert-Waters
campaign was born.125 By the beginning of 2014, the effort to “gut”
Biggert-Waters enjoyed strong bipartisan support.126
This campaign achieved its goal on March 21, 2014, just twenty
months after Biggert-Waters was passed, as the President signed into
law the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014.127
While previous versions of the law had simply delayed
implementation of Biggert-Waters’s premium reforms, the version
that ultimately became law undid many of them altogether.128 The
Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act repealed the
provisions of Biggert-Waters that had eliminated subsidized rates for

“hoping for wealthy cash buyers who are not required to carry flood insurance,” a
feature of the program that will be discussed in more detail below. Id.
125. See, e.g., Bruce Alpert, Political Foes Mary Landrieu and Bill Cassidy Are
on the Same Side on Flood Insurance, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, January 9,
2014; Editorial, House Needs to Provide Real Relief on Flood Insurance Rates,
NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, February 16, 2014; Ben Myers, Louisiana
Politicians Praise New Flood Insurance Law, With Eye on Next Steps, NEW
ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, March 24, 2014; see also Verchick & Johnson, supra
note 3, at 711-12.
126. Davenport, supra note 123. Maxine Waters herself became a leader of the
effort to rewrite the legislation she sponsored: “Never in our wildest dreams did we
think the premium increases would be what they appear to be today,” she
explained. Id. As some commentators have observed, this claim is dubious at best.
Verchick & Johnson, supra note 3, at 711-12. The GAO had long predicted that
the elimination of subsidized rates would lead to such problems, and recommended
offering subsidized premiums based on financial need. Id. at 712 (citing U.S.
Gov’t Accountability Office, Options for Addressing the Financial Impact of
Subsidized Premium Rates on the National Flood Insurance Program (2008)).
127. Pub. L. No. 113-89, 128 Stat. 1020.
128. The House and the Senate originally passed two different versions of the
law. The Senate, perceiving the main problem to be the elimination of
grandfathered rates based on hastily prepared new FIRMs, simply delayed BiggertWaters’s rate increases until either the completion of an affordability study or six
months after a certification from FEMA that it had come up with “technically
credible flood hazard data in all areas where [FIRMs] are prepared or updated.” S.
1926, 113th Cong., § 103(a)(3); see also Cong. Rec. S613-627 (Jan. 30, 2014).
The Senate version was passed and sent to the House on January 31, but the House
proceeded with its own version, which was finally passed by the Senate and signed
into law. See H.R. 3370.
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certain policies.129 More specifically, the Act repealed the provisions
of Biggert-Waters that eliminated subsidized rates for all new
policies and for all policies on newly purchased properties.130
The Act also repealed the portion of Biggert-Waters that
eliminated grandfathered rates. Under Biggert-Waters, rates were to
be adjusted for “any property located in an area that is participating
in the [NFIP] . . . to accurately reflect the current risk of flood to such
property.”131 This provision was eliminated.132 The Flood Insurance
Affordability Act did, however, clarify that new policies on
properties not located in 100-year flood zones would no longer enjoy
protected grandfathered rates going forward if FEMA later remapped
them into 100-year flood zones.133 In other words, all policies on
properties outside 100-year flood zones purchased after the Act’s
enactment would be subject to increased premiums if the properties
they insured were later determined by FEMA to lie within special
flood hazard areas, with any increase to be phased in gradually.134
The reinstatement of preexisting grandfathered rates and subsidized
rates for new policies and newly purchased properties was aimed at
eliminating Biggert-Waters’ impacts on the real estate market, so that
prospective buyers of flood-prone properties could rest assured that
they would continue paying subsidized rates, or would be able to get
new policies at old, subsidized rates, at least for properties already
determined to lie within 100-year flood zones. The new law also
limited rate increases on all properties to no more than 18 percent
each year.135 Congress was able to conclude that the new Flood
Insurance Affordability Act would not worsen the NFIP’s financial
condition thanks to the inclusion of a $25 annual surcharge on all

129. Homeowner Flood Ins. Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, §§ 3,
4, 128 Stat. 1021-22 (2014).
130. Id. § 3, 128 Stat. 1021-22 (striking portions of Biggert-Waters § 100205,
Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126 Stat. 917, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4014(g)(1) - (2)).
131. Biggert-Waters, § 100207.
132. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 § 4, Pub. L. No.
113-89, 128 Stat. 1022.
133. Id. § 6, 128 Stat. 1023.
134. Id.
135. Id. § 5, 128 Stat. 1022.
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policyholders and a $250 surcharge on policies for business
properties and second homes.136
From a policy perspective, the Flood Insurance Affordability Act is
a minor disaster. Assuming it is in fact correct that the across the
board surcharges make up for the loss in premiums to the NFIP, the
act nonetheless does much to hamper the ability of flood insurance to
incentivize mitigation of the country’s overall flood risk. High
insurance premiums had the ability to dissuade prospective
purchasers from buying flood-prone properties. While this financial
toll was obviously hard on those properties’ owners, for those who
chose not to buy it could have meant a life free from flooding.
Subsidized rates do much to hinder the ability of flood insurance
premiums to act as a kind of warning mechanism, as will be
discussed in more detail below. The continuation of grandfathered
rates has a similarly distorting effect on the ability of flood insurance
premiums to incentivize mitigation activity. After the bill’s passage,
homeowners could rejoice that they would no longer need to elevate
their homes in search of more affordable premiums.137 Lost in the
jubilation was the fact that by elevating, a home might be dry through
the next flood instead of several feet underwater. Still, the
Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act did leave in place
some of Biggert-Waters’s reforms, notably its elimination of
subsidized rates for second homes, businesses, repetitive loss
properties, and properties that undergo substantial damage or
improvements.
F. Requiring Participation: The Lender Mandate
Efforts to raise rates have always faced the specter of adverse
selection. If FEMA raises rates closer to actuarially sound levels, the
thinking goes, people will simply choose not to purchase flood

136. Id. § 8, 128 Stat. 1023-24; see also Cong. Rec. H2134 (Mar. 4, 2014)
(remarks of rep. Hensarling) (noting that H.R. 3370 is “technically PAYGO
compliant”).
137. See, e.g., Annie Linsky, Good News: The Government Will No Longer
Make You Put Your House on Stilts, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 14, 2014,
available at http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-03-14/good-news-thegovernment-will-no-longer-make-you-put-your-house-on-stilts.
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insurance, sending the program into ever deeper financial straits.138
Theoretically at least, the people most likely to opt out of the
program as rates increase are those who face (or at least perceive
themselves to face) the lowest risk, leaving behind a riskier, and
therefore more expensive, pool of policyholders.139
The source of this problem is the fact that individuals are largely
free to decline to purchase flood insurance if it does not seem
appealing to them. While the NFIP does include a mechanism that
forces certain people to purchase policies, it is underinclusive,
underenforced, and based on an erroneous understanding of the
constitutional limits on Congress’s power, with the result that the
percentage of individuals in flood-prone areas who have flood
insurance is often tragically low.
This mechanism, known as the “lender mandate,” requires
individuals to purchase flood insurance on properties located within a
100-year flood zone whenever a “regulated lending institution”
provides a mortgage secured by that property.140 In fact, it would be
more accurate to say that the statute requires lenders to require
borrowers to purchase flood insurance. The statute directs federal
entities that regulate lending institutions to promulgate regulations to
this effect, and they have.141 Essentially, all new loans secured by
property in 100-year flood zones are supposed to carry with them the
requirement that the borrower obtain flood insurance.
As is evident, the scope of the lender mandate is limited. It does
not require that anyone outside a 100-year flood zone purchase flood
insurance, despite the fact that, according to FEMA, properties
outside these areas have historically accounted for about 25 percent
of NFIP claims.142 It also does not apply in non-participating
138. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-1063T, NATIONAL
FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS
FINANCIAL & OPERATIONS ISSUES 3 (2010).
139. See Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 42, at n.20.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(b). The amount of insurance required is the lesser of (1)
the maximum amount of coverage under the NFIP, (2) the outstanding principal
balance of the loan, or (3) the insurable value of the structure. Id.
141. See Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 42, at n.56 (citing regulations).
142. Id. at 14. Other estimates suggest that even this figure may be too low. One
study, for instance, estimated that 83 percent of losses from hurricane winds and
flooding resulted from Category 3, 4, and 5 storms, all of which are too infrequent
to qualify as 100-year flood events. Burby, supra note 20, at 177. Of course, this
number does not isolate the percentage of such damage that occurred outside 100-
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communities, regardless of their flood risk, since individuals in those
communities are not eligible to purchase flood insurance in the first
place.143 It also bears emphasizing that the lender mandate does not
apply to anyone who owns property without a mortgage.144 Overall,
it has been estimated that the lender mandate applies to about 50 to
60 percent of single family homes in 100-year flood zones.145
Even where the lender mandate does require that individuals
purchase flood insurance, enforcement is often lax. It was not until
1994 that the NFIP explicitly required that flood insurance be
maintained for the life of the loan at issue.146 Moreover, the lender
mandate must be enforced by whichever agency has direct oversight
of the lender in question.147 To a surprising degree, banks have failed
to require that their debtors carry flood insurance.148 A 2006 study

year flood zones, but it does call into question the propriety of using the 100-year
flood as the statistical benchmark for requiring flood insurance.
143. It should be noted, however, that the number of individuals facing a special
flood hazard in non-participating communities is probably quite small. See supra
note 64. Originally, regulated lending institutions were prohibited from lending in
communities that did not participate in the NFIP. This rule was removed by statute
in 1977. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95128 § 703(a), 91 Stat. 1144 (1977).
144. In recent years, the share of homes purchased without a mortgage has
increased. One study estimated that more than half of homes sold in 2012 were “all
cash” sales. Nick Timaros, Report: Half of All Homes Are Being Purchased with
Cash,
Wall
St.
J.,
Aug.
15,
2013,
available
at
http://blogs.wsj.com/developments/2013/08/15/report-half-of-all-homes-are-beingpurchased-with-cash/; see also Julia Zhu, An Astonishing Share of Homebuyers Are
Paying
All
Cash,
NPR,
Jan.
24,
2014,
available
at
http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2014/01/23/265264740/an-astonishing-share-ofhome-buyers-are-paying-all-cash.
145. Lloyd Dixon, et al., THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM’S
MARKET PENETRATION RATE: ESTIMATES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS xvii (RAND
2006).
146. Reigle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-325 § 522(a), 108 Stat. 2160, 2257.
147. Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 42, at 15.
148. See Rachel Lisotta, In Over our Heads: The Inefficiencies of the National
Flood Insurance Program and the Institution of Federal Tax Incentives, 10 LOY.
MAR. L. J. 511, 518 (2012). One possible explanation for banks’ failure to ensure
that borrowers purchase and maintain flood insurance is that mortgages are
frequently sold and securitized on the secondary market. See Scales, supra note 46,
at n.68 and accompanying text.
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by RAND estimated compliance with the lender mandate at between
75 and 80 percent nationally, with significant local variation.149
Nevertheless, the lender mandate does make a difference. The
same RAND study estimated that only about 20 percent of homes not
subject to the lender mandate carried flood insurance.150 Overall,
about half of all single-family homes in 100-year flood zones have
NFIP policies, while outside the 100-year flood zone, the NFIP’s
market penetration is estimated to be only about 1 percent.151 The
magnitude of the problem is often revealed by disasters themselves.
In St. Bernard Parish, which was decimated by Hurricane Katrina,
only 57.7 percent of homes had flood insurance before the storm.152
In Orleans Parish, of which about 80 percent lay underwater in the
days after Katrina,153 only 40 percent of homeowners had flood
insurance.154 Along the Gulf Coast of Mississippi, which was
virtually wiped out by storm surges, less than 10 percent of homes
had flood insurance.155
This weak participation undermines the NFIP in several crucially
important ways. First, it deprives the program of valuable premiums
that could be used to help it achieve its age-old mandate of selfsufficiency. Second, it removes the safety net that flood insurance
provides, leaving the uninsured dependent on uncertain federal aid in
the wake of major disasters, and increasing the pressure on the
federal government to provide such aid. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, allowing individuals to decline to purchase flood
insurance deprives the program of its vital signaling function, its
ability to force individuals to acknowledge and internalize the risks
they face by placing a regular, yearly dollar figure on that risk. This
last feature represents the NFIP’s, and indeed the country’s, greatest
hope of discouraging risky coastal development as a matter of policy

149.
150.
151.
152.

Dixon, et al., supra note 145, at xvii.
Id.
Id. at xvi.
Robert H. Jerry, II & Steven E. Roberts, Regulating the Business of
Insurance: Federalism in an Age of Difficult Risk, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 835,
877 (2006).
153. See Jere Longman & Swell Chan, Flooding Recedes in New Orleans; U.S.
Inquiry is Set, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2005, at A1.
154. Jerry & Roberts, supra note 152, at 877.
155. Scales, supra note 46, at 15.
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at the federal level. It is for these reasons that an individual mandate
for flood insurance is so badly needed.
IV. SOLVING THE RIDDLE OF FLOOD-PRONE DEVELOPMENT: AN
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE FOR THE NFIP
The NFIP has been plagued by dueling problems since its
inception. On the one hand, political pressures and the fear of
adverse selection have driven the program to provide rates that are in
many cases cheaper than they should be. This is, in a sense, in
keeping with the goal of providing the safety net of flood insurance
by ensuring that it remains attractive to owners of flood-prone
properties. On the other hand, by making flood insurance cheaper
than it should be, the NFIP creates a moral hazard that undermines its
goal of helping reduce the nation’s aggregate flood risk. Even
though it requires the implementation of a complex set of mitigation
measures, by subsidizing coastal development the NFIP has actually
coaxed more people into harm’s way, even while it attempts to blunt
the force of that harm. This problematic tension is in a sense baked
in to the NFIP,156 and has led to calls for its wholesale elimination,
particularly as it becomes clear that climate change will only
exacerbate the various flood risks we face. To accommodate these
competing goals, the NFIP must strike a balance that avoids the
opposing perils of providing such a robust safety net that it ends up
making life in a flood-prone area more attractive, and making
participation in the program so burdensome that it drives away
potential insureds.
In this Section, I will argue that requiring that owners of property
in flood-prone areas hold flood insurance would make this balance
much easier to strike. Part IV.A discusses the details of this
proposal, including the scope of its application and its constitutional
156. The danger of creating a moral hazard by providing subsidized flood
insurance has been a primary concern since before the program’s creation, when a
federal task force on flood control policy observed that if “insurance were used to
subsidize new capital investment, it would aggravate flood damages and constitute
gross public irresponsibility.” Communication from the President of the United
States Transmitting a Report by the Task Force on Federal Flood Control Policy,
H.R. Doc No. 465, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 18 (1966). To counteract this problem,
the report suggested that “owners of subsidized development [be] precluded from
rebuilding destroyed or obsolete structures on the flood plain.” Id. This became a
feature of the NFIP, although in a much weaker form. See supra note 70.
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basis. Part IV.B suggests that an individual mandate would help the
program escape its financial straits by increasing the pool of
premiums available. Part IV.C argues that requiring all owners of
flood-prone property to hold insurance would strengthen the
important safety net the NFIP provides, reducing pressure on
Congress to provide massive relief programs in the wake of major
floods. Finally, Part IV.D argues that with an individual mandate,
and with premiums set at actuarial levels, the NFIP could solve its
moral hazard problem and become an important tool for
discouraging, to an efficient degree, ownership of flood-prone
properties. In this sense, insurance can act as a form of land use
regulation, one that is more predictable and efficient than traditional
nuisance law while also being more nuanced and flexible than
zoning.
A. What an Individual Mandate for Flood Insurance Might Look
Like
At its most basic level, an individual mandate for flood insurance
would simply require that every owner of property in a 100-year
flood zone purchase and maintain flood insurance. This system
would do away with the NFIP’s current reliance on the lender
mandate as well as its distinction between pre- and post-FIRM
properties. There is, after all, no policy reason for requiring that only
properties with mortgages carry flood insurance. It seems, rather,
that the lender mandate was motivated by a desire to avoid raising the
issue of whether Congress had the constitutional power to require
individuals to purchase flood insurance.157 Without any link to
whether or not the property is encumbered by a mortgage, there
would no longer be any reason to leave enforcement of the mandate
in the hands of banks and their regulators, which have not been very
effective in this role.158 Far better, it would seem, would be a taxbased system like that used to ensure compliance with the individual
mandate for health insurance.
157. See Florida v. United States, 648 F.3d 1235, 1289-90 (11th Cir. 2011)
(arguing that Congress’s failure to implement an individual mandate for flood
insurance is evidence that it did not believe it had the power to do so). The
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sebelius makes clear that an individual
mandate would be permissible if structured as a tax. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585 (2012).
158. See supra notes 146-149.
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There is, similarly, no longer any justification for distinguishing
between properties on the basis of whether they pre- or post-date the
issuance of a FIRM. The reason that pre-FIRM properties currently
enjoy subsidized, “chargeable” rates is that only post-FIRM
properties are required to be elevated above base flood level.159 (PreFIRM properties, which sit below base flood level, thus face a much
higher risk, and would be required to pay much higher rates if those
rates reflected their actuarial risk.) With an individual mandate, there
would be no need to coax such properties into the program with
cheap premiums. There is no other justification for granting owners
of pre-FIRM properties an entitlement to subsidized rates.
It makes sense, instead, to account for any fairness concerns by
reducing the cost of flood insurance for homeowners who cannot
afford it. Better to provide a break on premiums based on financial
need than on the age of one’s house. The danger here, however, is
that making flood insurance too cheap for low-income homeowners
would have the effect of encouraging the poor to settle in especially
risky areas. The fallout from Biggert-Waters has already shown that
flood insurance premiums can have a significant impact on real estate
prices.160 If a neighborhood faces a particularly acute flood risk, it
may be that mandatory flood insurance premiums are so high that no
one who is required to pay them could afford to live there, leading to
a drop in prices. By exempting low-income homeowners from
paying flood insurance, the individual mandate would effectively
159. This distinction is natural enough; it would not be feasible to require at the
stroke of a pen that every existing structure be elevated above base flood level.
160. See, e.g., Jodi Schwan, Flood Insurance Puts Damper on Market, ARGUS
LEADER
(Sioux
Falls,
SD),
Feb.
28,
2014,
available
at
http://www.argusleader.com/article/20140228/BJUPDATES/302270005/Floodinsurance-puts-damper-market; Kathleen Lynn, North Jersey Homeowners
Trapped in Flood Zones Looking for Help from Feds, THE RECORD (Hackensack,
NJ), Feb. 25, 2014, available at http://www.northjersey.com/real-estate/risingflood-insurance-premiums-make-homes-impossible-to-sell-1.735866; Jeff Frantz,
As Flood Insurance Gets More Expensive, Experts Predict Lower Home Values,
Fewer Sales, More Foreclosures, PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg, PA), Jan. 23, 2014,
available at http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2014/01/national_flood_
insurance_progr_3.html; Nick Malawskey, Family Wants to Move On, but
Creekside House Isn’t Selling; Agent Blames Flood Insurance Rates, PATRIOTNEWS (Harrisburg, PA), Jan. 24, 2014, available at http://www.
pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2014/01/flood_insurance_homeowners_sto_3.htm
l.

2015]

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

203

increase their incentive to move to a risky area, by providing for free
something that would represent a major expense of owning such
properties for everyone else.
One potential solution to this problem would be to stop short of
making flood insurance entirely free for low-income individuals and
to tie premiums to a percentage of income rather than to the actuarial
risk faced by the property. Homeowners with incomes below a
certain threshold would thus be required to pay the lower of the
actuarial cost of the flood insurance on their property or some
percentage of their income. This approach would avoid forcing the
poor out of their homes, but would retain enough of the cost
associated with flood insurance to keep risky areas from becoming
disproportionately attractive to those who cannot afford to pay
actuarial rates.
More could also be made of the NFIP’s “buyout” program. The
buyout program makes federal funds available to cover up to 75
percent of the cost of purchasing insured, flood-damaged homes, at a
price that is the greater of (1) the purchase price paid by the current
owner, (2) the amount of any outstanding mortgage on the property,
or (3) the value of the property before it was last flooded.161 Once
the property has been acquired, it must remain open space forever.162
Notably, the burden is on states to set up such programs and receive
and process applications from individuals. There is no standing
buyout offer from the federal government, nor is there any way to
apply for a buyout from FEMA directly.163 Making buyouts
available to all policyholders who face, say, an increase in their
premiums of more than a certain percentage would help ease the
burden of homeowners whose properties stand to lose value as flood
insurance premiums rise. For those without the resources to move
elsewhere, it could provide an invaluable lifeline.164
Why keep the line between properties in the 100-year flood zone
and those outside it, and require that only the former carry flood
161. 42 U.S.C. § 4102a. Local governments are explicitly barred from using
eminent domain to acquire properties. 44 C.F.R. § 80.11(a).
162. 44 C.F.R. § 80.11(f).
163. Id. § 80.5; see also FEMA, Hazard Mitigation Assistance – Property
Acquisition
(Buyouts),
https://www.fema.gov/application-developmentprocess/hazard-mitigation-assistance-property-acquisition-buyouts.
164. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Givings Recapture: Funding Public Acquisition of
Private Property Interests on the Coasts, 27 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 295, 346 (2003).

204

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXVI

insurance? As many have pointed out, the 100-year flood zone is a
crude and sometimes wildly misleading metric for gauging flood risk,
and it is certainly not the case that properties outside the zone face no
flood risk at all.165 It may well make sense to make the 500-year
flood the NFIP’s statistical baseline.166 There are, however, several
reasons to stop short of simply requiring that everyone purchase flood
insurance, regardless of what flood zone they inhabit.167 First,
estimating the national flood risk at the level of individual properties
is a gargantuan undertaking, one that took FEMA years to
complete.168 As flood risks change, whether due to erosion,
subsidence, or sea level rise, FEMA must update its risk maps, a
critically important and costly enterprise. There is value in
continuing to use a framework into which so much has been invested,
and that has the benefit of decades of revision and refinement behind
it. Second, and more importantly, stopping short of requiring
universal coverage creates a sharp line, with those required to pay for
flood insurance separated from the rest, instead of infinite gradations
applicable to everyone. Because flood risk, unlike health risk, is
something that one can essentially avoid entirely, it makes sense to
strengthen the incentive to avoid purchasing flood-prone property by
drawing a bright line around those who face a certain level of risk,
however imperfect that line may be.
B. Easing the NFIP’s Financial Problems
Incorporating an individual mandate into the NFIP would do much
to help mitigate the program’s notorious financial problems. By
increasing the number of policyholders, an individual mandate would
165. See supra notes 109-111. In its report on coastal risk on the East and Gulf
Coasts, the National Research Council pointed out that “[t]here is no solid basis of
evidence to justify a default 1 percent annual chance (100-year) design level of
coastal risk reduction.” NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 6. The
report went on to note that this baseline “was established for management
purposes, not to achieve an optimal balance between risk and benefits,” and that
there is “no evidence that reducing risk to a 1 percent annual-chance event is in the
best interests of society or that this level is necessarily acceptable to the general
public.” Id.
166. See supra note 111.
167. See Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 42, at 7, 49-55 (proposing a system of
mandated universal coverage for flood insurance, with premiums paid through tax
withholding).
168. See Knowles & Kunreuther, supra note 4, at 332-36.
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increase the pool of premiums available to the NFIP, helping spread
the risk across a larger pool of insureds. It would also eliminate the
adverse selection problem, in which those who perceive themselves
to face lower flood risk drop out of the program, leaving behind an
ever-riskier pool of policyholders. In the early years of the program,
dismal participation by communities and individuals led Congress to
pass a series of reforms aimed at making flood insurance more
enticing, some of which plague the NFIP to this day.169 Without the
constant threat of adverse selection, the NFIP would have more
freedom to raise rates to actuarial levels without fearing a mass
exodus.170 Of course, more policyholders means more premiums, but
it also means more claims that must be paid in the event of a flood.
To what extent would increasing the number of participants in the
NFIP truly help the program financially?
In answering this question, much depends on the extent of the
adverse selection problem in flood insurance. If those who choose
not to purchase flood insurance are in fact statistically less likely to
experience flooding, then getting them back into the program would
help improve the pool of policyholders from an actuarial perspective.
An analogy can be drawn to the recent debate over the individual
mandate in the Affordable Care Act. The health insurance market
faced a similar adverse selection problem: healthy young people were
more likely to simply go without health insurance, and insurers found
themselves struggling without their valuable premiums.171 Similarly,
169. Id. at 337-38.
170. The political reaction to increased rates, on the other hand, would likely be

even more intense than it is now. As explained below, however, there are reasons
to see this as a positive development both for the program and for the country’s
overall exposure to flood risk. See infra text at notes 209-211.
171. The passage of the Affordable Care Act was expected to exacerbate this
effect dramatically, as it both reduced the degree to which insurance companies
could charge higher premiums based on individual risk factors and guaranteed that
those who became sick and sought insurance would be able to get coverage for
preexisting conditions. See Nat’l Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,
132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585, Brief for America’s Health Ins. Plans, et al. as Amici
Curiae, at 5-6. These measures made the ACA’s individual mandate all the more
critical in ensuring that private health insurance markets would continue to thrive.
Amicus Brief of America’s Health Ins. Plans, at 7 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I)
(Congressional finding that individual mandate’s minimization of adverse selection
was “essential to creating effective health insurance markets in which improved
health insurance products that are guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of
preexisting conditions can be sold.”)). Absent the individual mandate, the Court
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assuming it is in fact the case that those who do not have flood
insurance face a lower flood risk, on average, than those who do, an
individual mandate would strengthen the NFIP.172
When discussing those who own property in 100-year flood zones
and yet do not have flood insurance, it is important to remember that
this group consists of two categories: those to whom the NFIP’s
“lender mandate” does not apply, and those who are currently
required to maintain flood insurance and yet do not do so. An
individual mandate would apply to the second group only to the
extent that it is more effective at ensuring compliance than the lender
mandate is today. There is every reason to think this could be
achieved. If participation in the NFIP had nothing to do with
whether one’s property was encumbered by a mortgage, there would
be no reason for financial regulators, and the banks they oversee, to
retain the duty of ensuring that borrowers comply with their
obligation to hold flood insurance. Since this system has not been
particularly effective, giving the job of enforcing the mandate to
FEMA, or indeed to the IRS, would likely increase participation
among those who are already obligated to participate but do not.173
It is hard to generalize about the first group, property owners who
are not currently subject to the lender mandate but would be required
to purchase flood insurance by an individual mandate. One is
tempted to conjure up images of the vacation homes of hedge fund
managers, perched on oceanfront dunes and unencumbered by debt.
This image may well be misleading. In Pennsylvania, for instance,
where flood zones are concentrated along rivers rather than on
observed, healthy people would “delay purchasing health insurance until they
become sick, relying on the promise of guaranteed and affordable coverage.”
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2585.
172. While no comprehensive study has evaluated the magnitude of the gap
between the flood risk faced by those who purchase flood insurance and those who
do not, adverse selection is almost universally treated as a significant problem
faced by the NFIP and a major factor limiting FEMA’s ability to raise rates. See,
e.g., GAO, Continued Actions, supra note 103, at 5-6.
173. The Affordable Care Act penalizes through the tax system individuals who
fail to maintain health insurance. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 7. Although it remains to
be seen how effective this provision will be, a similar enforcement mechanism
could easily be adopted for flood insurance. See Luke & Abramovsky, supra note
42, at 7, 42-55 (proposing replacement of the NFIP with a “mandatory social
insurance plan” paid for with income tax withholding and featuring refunds and
rate adjustments to encourage mitigation).
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beaches, properties at risk of flood are, on average, lower in value
and contain older residents who are more likely to live in poverty.174
Regardless of whether property owners newly subject to a flood
insurance mandate would be, as a group, more or less wealthy, their
very participation in the NFIP would help it financially. Because
flood insurance risks are so highly correlated, having a larger pool of
policyholders necessarily makes the program more financially
stable.175
C. Strengthening the NFIP’s Safety Net and Relieving Pressure
Elsewhere
By requiring homeowners in flood-prone areas to carry flood
insurance, an individual mandate would also strengthen the important
safety net the NFIP provides. This feature of flood insurance – its
ability to insulate property owners from flood losses – would seem to
be an unqualified good, and yet it has been one of the aspects of the
NFIP that has led some to question the very idea of federally
provided flood insurance. A common refrain among those who have
called for the outright elimination of the NFIP is that by helping
property owners recoup their flood losses, the program is effectively
encouraging them to rebuild in areas where it may not be wise, from
a broader policy perspective, to do so. Assuming that we should be
doing all we can to discourage flood-prone development, these critics
argue, the best course is to simply eliminate the NFIP and let
property owners bear their losses and move to higher ground.176
This argument rests on a faulty premise. The political reality in
America is that flood victims are not likely to be left to fend for
themselves in the absence of a federal flood insurance program.
Even with the NFIP in place, Congress has been moved to provide,
174. Jeff Frantz, Five Things We Learned from the Senate Hearing on
Skyrocketing Flood Insurance Costs, PATRIOT NEWS (Harrisburg, PA), Jan. 28,
2014,
available
at
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2014/01/
national_flood_insurance_progr_11.html (reporting testimony by Executive
Director of the Center for Rural Pennsylvania before state Senate); see also
Verchick & Johnson, supra note 3, at 715 (noting that “many floodplain
communities . . . are not the playgrounds of the rich, but the working-class
neighborhoods whose low property values attracted and maintained residents over
time).
175. Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 42, at 22-24.
176. See supra note 42.
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with overwhelming support, massive aid packages in the wake of
large floods. In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,
Congress approved, by a vote of 410 to 11 in the House and 97 to 0
in the Senate, $51.8 billion in aid.177 That allocation would prove to
be only the first of a series, eventually amounting to roughly $120
billion.178 Portions of a number of post-Katrina appropriations
eventually became Louisiana’s “Road Home” program, which began
life with roughly $7.5 billion in federal funds.179 Under the program,
homeowners received money to rebuild or repair their homes based
on the amount of damage not covered by flood insurance.180 After
Hurricane Sandy, Congress provided roughly $60 billion in aid, not
just for the rescue and personal safety of victims, but also to
compensate for property damage.181
Nor is this solicitude for the needs of disaster victims a modern
phenomenon. Congress has, since the dawn of the republic,
displayed a remarkable willingness to indemnify the victims of
disasters of all varieties.182 Some have attributed this munificence to
the same correlation problem that made private flood insurance so
difficult to provide. Because disasters tend to be concentrated in one
geographic area, their victims form natural “interest groups” that, in
our political system, can plead their case in Congress with particular

177. Peter Baker & Amy Goldstein, Congress Approves $51.8 Billion for
Victims, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2005.
178. BRUCE R. LINDSAY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43537, FEMA’S DISASTER
RELIEF FUND: OVERVIEW AND SELECTED ISSUES 13 (2014).
179. Davida Finger, Stranded and Squandered: Lost on the Road Home, 7
SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 59, 64, n.26 (2008) (citing series of appropriations); Leslie
Eaton, Slow Home Grants Stall Progress in New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11,
2006, at A1.
180. See Leslie Eaton, Hurricane Aid Finally Flowing Directly to Homeowners,
N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2006, at A1. The Road Home Program funneled money
appropriated by Congress through the department of Housing and Urban
Development’s Community Development Block Grant program. Louisiana and
Mississippi administered distinct programs, with different rules and different
priorities. One notable feature of Louisiana’s plan was that it imposed a thirty
percent penalty on homeowners who were required to purchase flood insurance
under the NFIP’s lender mandate but did not do so. See id.
181. Lindsay, supra note 178, at 13.
182. Michele L. Landis, Let Me Next Time Be ‘Tried by Fire’: Disaster Relief
and the Origins of the Welfare State 1789-1874, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 967, 973 et seq.
(1998).
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effectiveness.183 Others have detected a moral judgment, one that
treats victims as blameless and thus deserving.184 The broader point
is that generous disaster relief has always been a theme of
Congressional action. There is thus every reason to think that if the
NFIP were eliminated, the political pressure to provide this type of
aid would only increase.185 The moral hazard that arises from
indemnifying the losses of flood victims wasn’t created by the NFIP.
The NFIP merely allowed it to take a particular shape, one channel
among many by which the government socializes the losses
associated with floods.
It is thus more productive to start with the premise that the risks of
flooding will be spread beyond the property owners who bear them,
whether through the NFIP or otherwise. Under the NFIP, at least as
it is intended to function, those risks are spread onto other owners of
flood-prone properties. Without the NFIP, they would be spread onto
all American taxpayers. The popular notion that the NFIP creates a
moral hazard by incentivizing property ownership in flood-prone
183. See Saul Levmore, Coalitions and Quakes: Disaster Relief and Its
Prevention, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 4-6 (1996).
184. Landis, supra note 182, at 971, 988-98 (tracing the “intellectual and
spiritual traditions prevalent among the founders” that “provide some insight into
the sympathetic treatment they afforded disasters”).
185. It would also, I submit, be morally unacceptable to adopt a policy of
refusing any governmental aid to owners of flooded property. Arguments for the
elimination of the NFIP are often couched in moral terms, suggesting that people
who “choose” to own property in flood-prone areas “know” the risks and thus
should be forced to bear them. See, e.g., Richard Reeves, Hurricane$,
Earthquake$ and Flood$: If People Want to Build Their Houses in Dangerous
Places, Why Should the Rest of Us Pay When Disaster Strikes?, 26 WASH.
MONTHLY 10 (1994). As for the concept of choice, it is simplistic and unfair to
think that every flood victim could just move out of a flood-prone area if he or she
chose. Here I am thinking in particular of residents of the Lower Ninth Ward,
which was quite poor but had a notably high rate of homeownership before large
swaths of the neighborhood were wiped out by Hurricane Katrina. See Juliette
Landphair, The Forgotten People of New Orleans: Community, Vulnerability, and
the Lower Ninth Ward, 94 J. OF AM. HIST. 837, 837, n.3 (Dec. 2007). Nor does the
idea that people “know” the risk when they move in hold up under scrutiny.
Accurately understanding the flood risk faced by a particular property is a task that
defeated private insurance companies in the 20th century and has at times
flummoxed even the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Homeowners
typically “know the risks” of flooding only because they are able to consult a FIRM
that has been prepared by the government, a document that would presumably not
exist if the call to eliminate the NFIP were heeded.
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areas is thus misleading at best, because it requires assuming that
individuals would be forced to bear flood risks on their own if the
NFIP were eliminated.186 In fact, far from creating a moral hazard,
the NFIP has the potential to substantially reduce the corrosive
subsidy that other forms of flood protection and aid provide to
owners of flood-prone property.
D. Efficiently Discouraging Risky Development
It is, at this point, clear that we should not be encouraging
ownership of flood-prone property by providing a subsidy in the form
of below-market flood insurance. Indeed, if we are to stand any
chance of adapting to a future of rising seas, powerful hurricanes, and
frequent downpours, national policy should help facilitate the
migration of people out of harm’s way. Governmental approaches to
discouraging settlement in flood zones could take a wide range of
forms. The most extreme approach would be to simply outlaw
permanent human habitation in certain areas, which would make
floods relatively toothless in terms of their ability to harm or kill
people or even disrupt our daily routines or affect the economy. This
has, in fact, been done in certain limited areas.187 Prohibiting flood186. For all its problems, the NFIP has proved to be a much more effective tool
for compensating property owners who suffer flood losses than alternative
mechanisms that have been established after major disasters. Louisiana’s Road
Home Program was scandalously inept at handing out money. In its first four
months, the program closed fewer than one hundred homeowner grants, leading the
RAND Corporation to conclude that “the overall timeliness of the grant-making
process has not been consistently good and predictable.” RICK EDEN & PATRICIA
BOREN, TIMELY ASSISTANCE: EVALUATING THE SPEED OF ROAD HOME
GRANTMAKING 68 (RAND Gulf State Policy Institute, RAND Corporation 2008),
available
at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/2008/RAND
_DB557.pdf; see also Editorial, The Long Wait Home, NEW ORLEANS TIMESPICAYUNE, Mar. 23, 2008, at 6 (responding to RAND report); Finger, supra note
179, at 62-63. The NFIP, by contrast, had paid more than 95% of all its Gulf Coast
claims by May 2006, eight months after Katrina.
See U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: NEW
PROCESSES AIDED HURRICANE KATRINA CLAIMS HANDLING, BUT FEMA’S
OVERSIGHT SHOULD BE IMPROVED, at 6 (Dec. 2006), available at
www.gao.gov/assets/260/254481.pdf.
187. See Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (holding that
South Carolina’s Beachfront Management Act had effected a taking by preventing
property owner from building any permanent habitable structure on coastal land he
had purchased with that goal in mind). Notably, bans on development in fragile
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prone habitation by fiat is not, however, a viable solution to the long
term problem of flooding, for a host of reasons. Perhaps most
obviously, it would require the forced abandonment of enormous
portions of the country, where millions of people live and work.188
Even if it were politically or legally feasible, the forced, permanent
evacuation of flood zones would not be a desirable or efficient
response to the problem of flood risk. Flood zones contain many
billions of dollars worth of real estate, comprising an untold number
of beloved homes and successful businesses.189 While the costs
associated with flood damage can be staggering, it is wrong to
assume that they always outweigh the benefits derived by property
owners. Consider, as a simplistic example, a fisherman who lives
and works in an exposed coastal area. If he earns a profit of
$100,000 every year by living and working there, it will only make
sense for him to abandon the coast and move inland if he calculates
his flood risk at more than $100,000 per year. In other words, as
long as the fisherman’s flood insurance premiums are less than the
benefit he derives from his flood-prone property, he’ll choose to stay.
Human beings are not purely rational actors, and flooding has the
nasty tendency to overwhelm even the most well-reasoned analyses
of its risks. Calculations of the expected “cost” of a flood are also
not capable of capturing the tragic loss of a life, or a thousand. Still,
it is both reasonable and desirable to allow people to weigh for
themselves the costs and benefits of exposure to some degree of
disaster risk. It is a mistake to think that flood damage must be
avoided at all costs, because it is in many cases perfectly rational to
accept the costs of flooding and continue to own property in a floodprone area.190 Exposure to flood risk should be discouraged, but only
coastal zones like that discussed in Lucas are usually motivated by conservation
rather than avoiding flood risk. See id. at 1009-10.
188. Under current takings jurisprudence, government would also be required to
compensate property owners for this type of eviction, making it prohibitively
expensive. See John R. Nolan, Land Use and Climate Change: Lawyers
Negotiating Above Regulation, 78 BROOKLYN L. REV. 521 (2013) (discussing
takings clause obstacles to preventing development in flood prone areas).
189. Approximately 123.3 million people lived in coastal shoreline counties as of
2010, roughly half the U.S. population. Ernest B. Abbott, Flood Insurance and
Climate Change: Rising Sea Levels Challenge the NFIP, 26 Fordham Envtl. L.
Rev. 10, 10-11 (2014).
190. Oil companies, which can be relied upon to be more calculating than the
average person when it comes to cost/benefit analyses, provide a handy illustration.
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to an efficient degree. Mandatory flood insurance is an excellent way
of doing this, and would have salutary effects at the individual, local,
and national levels.
1. Individual Effects
Forcing property owners to pay premiums at actuarial rates
presents them with an annualized estimate of the costs associated
with the flood risk they face, and allows them to consider whether
those costs are outweighed by the benefits they derive from their
property. As Biggert-Waters ushered in increases in the premiums
paid by many policyholders, it created a kind of natural experiment
for examining how this mechanism works in the real world. In
innumerable news stories from the local papers in flood-prone areas,
homeowners reported being “priced out” of their homes by rising
flood insurance premiums.191 In many cases, a direct impact was felt
in the real estate market, as the knowledge that ownership of a
property would carry with it a bill for thousands of dollars in flood

Of the 4,000 platforms in the Gulf, 31 were severely damaged and 109 were
completely destroyed by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Ninety-one percent of the
area’s oil production capacity was knocked offline, and BP, to pick one example,
reported that the two hurricanes had cost it $700 million. See Heather Timmons &
Vikas Bajaj, BP Details its Damages from Hurricanes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2005,
at C5. It’s not hard to put a price on the amount of oil still left underground,
though, and to realize that making repairs and reopening is the right decision. See
Jad Mouawad & Barry Meier, Risk-Taking Rises as Oil Rigs in Gulf Drill Deeper,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2010, at A1 (reporting increased investment in offshore
platforms). For a more prosaic example, see Nick Malawskey, Riverside Artist, 83,
Says Flood Insurance Rates are Part of the Cost of the View, PATRIOT-NEWS
(Harrisburg, PA), Jan. 24, 2014, available at http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/
index.ssf/2014/01/flood_insurance_homeowners_sto.html
(reporting
elderly
resident of flood-prone house next to Susquehanna River’s decision to accept
higher premiums and remain in her home).
191. See, e.g., Editorial, Nation’s Flood Insurance Program Still Broken, N.J.
STAR-LEDGER, March 19, 2014; Jordan Blum, House Passes Flood Insurance Rate
Delay as Part of Budget Bill, THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), January 18, 2014;
Jenny Anderson, Outrage as Homeowners Prepare for Substantially Higher Flood
Insurance Rates, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2013, at A12; see also Abbot, supra note
189, at 54 (“The ironic result of the [Biggert-Waters] increases was that a program
designed to protect homeowners from losing their homes due to the possibility of
future flooding instead threatened homeowners with the probability of losing their
homes due to foreclosure well before any floodwaters arrived.”).
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insurance premiums had its impact on prices.192 This reaction proves
that it’s not federal flood insurance itself that creates a moral hazard,
it’s subsidized premiums.
The fallout over Biggert-Waters highlights another key feature of
flood insurance premiums as a mechanism for discouraging risky
development: their effects are felt ex-ante. Without flood insurance,
the costs of flood damage are borne by property owners only after
floods occur (and then only if they do not receive some other form of
aid). Flood insurance premiums annualize and internalize the costs
of flooding before any flood occurs, allowing – forcing, even –
homeowners to account for and react to their flood risk before they
are flooded. This feature heightens the ability of flood insurance to
deter risky development before its risks are realized, and before
homes are actually flooded.
In this sense, flood insurance has the ability to function something
like a zoning system. Like zoning, flood insurance regulates land use
(in that it discourages certain types of construction) in certain
geographic areas (in that purchasing it would be mandatory in those
areas). Unlike zoning, however, flood insurance functions by
imposing burdens in the form of annual premiums on certain
conduct. Where the typical zoning scheme simply mandates that
certain properties be put to certain uses, flood insurance functions as
an incentive system, discouraging rather than forbidding certain
activities.193 In this sense flood insurance functions more like a
common-law nuisance system, with its fine-grained ability to allocate
burdens and discourage behavior efficiently rather than outlawing
behavior categorically. Unlike nuisance, though, flood insurance
functions ex-ante and doesn’t require costly individual adjudication.
It is unreasonable to think that people are capable of performing
this kind of analysis without being required to pay flood insurance
192. See supra note 160.
193. Critics of the currently byzantine zoning systems in place in many

American cities have pointed out that zoning could be made both more equitable
and more flexible if it imposed costs on certain activities rather than outlawing
them while making variances and exemptions available to the politically connected.
One scholar, for instance, proposes a tax on certain land uses that aims to capture
the externalities created by those uses, thereby encouraging favored uses while
discouraging others to varying degrees. See Stewart E. Sterk, Exploring Taxation
as a Substitute for Overregulation in the Development Process, 78 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 417, 431-34 (2013).
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premiums. Individuals’ ability to account for and prepare for remote
yet potentially catastrophic risks is impaired by a series of muchstudied cognitive biases. First, and perhaps most damning, is
individuals’ general inability to accurately estimate the probability of
particular hazards.194 Certain risks, like the possibility of being
harmed by violent crime, are usually overestimated, while others are
routinely underestimated.195 Social scientists have noticed that
perceptions of the likelihood of disasters tend to spike just after
disasters occur and then quickly recede.196 One common explanation
is that perceptions of unlikely but catastrophic risk are subject to a
kind of recall bias. Risks that are easily called to mind, whether
because they frequently appear in the evening news or because they
recently occurred, loom large, while risks that have faded from
consciousness are underappreciated.197 Indeed, this effect can be
traced in the rates at which people purchase flood insurance, which
are highly correlated with whether they have experienced flood
losses in the previous year.198 That this is not surprising speaks to the
power of our bias favoring reaction to yesterday’s news.
Perhaps equally distorting is the tendency to believe that the
overall statistical likelihood of an event should be represented over
short time periods, or conversely, that occurrences over small sample
periods can be extrapolated far into the future. Note, for example,
that if you toss a coin four times, getting two heads and two tails is
the most likely outcome, and yet will happen only 37.5% of the

194. See Robert J. Meyer, Why We Under-Prepare for Hazards, in ON RISK AND
DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 153, 158 (Ronald J. Daniels,
Donald F. Kettl, & Howard Kunreuther, eds., 2006).
195. Id. at 158-59 (citing Jennifer S. Lerner, et al., Effects of Fear and Anger on
Perceived Risks of Terrorism: A National Field Experiment, 14 J. OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 144 (2003) (this study asked a sample of 973 Americans
what they thought was the probability that they would be harmed by violent crime
in the coming year. The mean answer was 43%, just under the mean estimate of
how likely they were to contract the flu, 47%.).
196. Jerry M. Burger & Michele L. Palmer, Changes in and Generalization of
Unrealistic Optimism Following Experiences with Stressful Events: Reactions to
the 1989 California Earthquake, 18 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
BULLETIN 39 (1992).
197. Meyer, supra note 194, at 159.
198. Mark J. Browne & Robert E. Hoyt, The Demand for Flood Insurance:
Empirical Evidence, 20 J. OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 291, 291 (2000).
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time.199 It is a common human intuition, perhaps borne of our
tendency to learn by trial and error, to believe that recent experience
is a fair guide to the future.200 When it comes to irregularly spaced
events like floods, this just isn’t so. To take but one example, South
Florida was directly hit by 27 hurricanes between 1887 and 1969, an
average of about one every three years.201 And yet in the 21 years
between 1970 and the arrival of Hurricane Andrew in 1992, only two
hurricanes hit the region. During this lull, development in the area
exploded, with catastrophic results.202 Hurricane Andrew caused
roughly $16 billion in losses,203 much of which was attributed to
recent coastal development.204
Beyond hindering our ability to accurately estimate our risk of
flood, cognitive biases can prevent us from taking purely rational
measures to protect against that risk. One of the most important
biases at work here is our tendency to overvalue immediate, certain
costs and undervalue long-term, uncertain benefits.205 Many scholars
who study these problems focus on the troubling failure of
individuals to take fairly simple, low-cost actions like complying
199. Meyer, supra note 194, at 160.
200. Meyer explains several other ways in which trial-and-error learning

hampers our ability to make rational decisions in the face of disasters. People tend
to react to their most recent experience. For instance, many people decided not to
evacuate before the arrival of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 because evacuating for
Hurricane Ivan in 2004 had proved time-consuming, costly, and pointless. Meyer
points out that this type of reactive behavior creates a “censoring bias,” in which
prudent preparations that keep individuals out of harm’s way tend to be selfdefeating, because by averting the harm people are more likely to underestimate the
magnitude of the hazard they faced. See id. at 156; see also Robert J. Meyer,
Failing to Learn from Experience about Catastrophes: The Case of Hurricane
Preparedness, 45 J. OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 25, 26-27 (2012) (reporting
experimental findings demonstrating that “the tendency to reduce investments in
protection given the absence of past losses is observed regardless of whether the
reason for this absence was the lack of a storm event or the presence of past
mitigation”).
201. Meyer, supra note 194, at 160.
202. Id.
203. Burby, supra note 20, at 178.
204. Meyer, supra note 194, at 160.
205. See Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing it Now or Later, 89 AM.
ECON. REV.103, 103 (1999) (examining “human tendency to grab immediate
rewards and to avoid immediate costs”); see also Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew
Rabin, Choice and Procrastination, 116 QUARTERLY J. OF ECON. 121 (2001).

216

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXVI

with mandatory evacuation orders in the face of oncoming
hurricanes. This cognitive bias is even more pronounced in the
context relevant here.206 Choosing to live farther away from a job or
loved ones to avoid a risk of flood, or choosing to spend many
thousands of dollars elevating or otherwise flood-proofing one’s
home, requires making significant and immediate personal sacrifices
to account for a risk that is often very distant and uncertain.
Mandatory flood insurance would reduce the impact of these biases
in a number of ways. First, as noted previously, flood insurance
smooths out the cost of flooding over time, taking immensely costly,
rare events and distributing their costs into smaller payments that
come due every year. One’s susceptibility to the various cognitive
biases discussed above becomes irrelevant; premiums must be paid.
Changing the way the costs of flooding are felt also removes flood
risk from the realm of long term costs (which are underestimated)
and places them firmly in the realm of immediate, certain costs
(which tend to elicit an overreaction). And by offering reduced
premiums in exchange for individual mitigation efforts (which the
NFIP already does), flood insurance offers immediate rewards in
exchange for immediate costs, a trade people stand a much greater
chance of making. As the reaction to Biggert-Waters demonstrated,
these changes have the power to influence individual decisions. The
effect of simply informing individuals that an area faces a high risk
of flood has been less pronounced.
2. Local Effects
An individual mandate for flood insurance would also strengthen
the pressure on local governments to confront their communities’
flood risk and take measures to mitigate it. Despite the fact that flood
losses are felt most keenly on a local level, local governments have
proved particularly inept when it comes to adopting and enforcing
mitigation measures.207 This has been referred to as the “local
government paradox,” and examples of its power abound.208
206. Meyer, supra note 194, at 165 (noting that this bias is “particularly acute”
“[w]hen making a choice between a current or delayed mitigation investment”).
207. Burby, supra note 20, at 178 (noting that “virtually no local governments in
the United States had adopted building or zoning regulations to mitigate flood
losses” before they were required to do so in order to participate in the NFIP).
208. Id. at 178-81; see supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
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Mandatory flood insurance would do much to drag flood risk into
prominence as a local political issue. To some extent the fallout from
Biggert-Waters, and the rapidity with which it was virtually repealed,
provide a handy demonstration, as politicians rushed to co-sponsor
the legislation that became the Homeowner Flood Insurance
Affordability Act of 2014.209 The efficacy of the Community Rating
System, which coaxes municipalities into adopting measures that
help reduce their flood risk, depends in large part on the degree of
pressure it can place on local governments.210 The more salient flood
insurance premiums become as a local political issue, the more local
governments will choose to enact stricter building codes and take
other measures that reduce premiums for the entire community. By
requiring more people to participate in the program, an individual
mandate for flood insurance would increase the pressure on local
governments to mitigate their flood risk.211
3. National Effects
A stronger NFIP would also lessen the pressure on Congress to
provide massive, one-off relief packages in the wake of major floods.
The National Research Council’s report to the Army Corps of
Engineers on flood risks along the East and Gulf Coasts made this
point forcefully. The federal government’s tendency to shoulder the
burden of paying for flood recovery, the report noted, “leads to
inefficiencies and inappropriate incentives that serve to increase the
nation’s exposure to risk.”212
The report referred to this
“misalignment of risks” as “[a] major impediment to U.S. coastal
hazard management.”213
Shifting the burden of paying for flood losses from Congressional
emergency appropriations to the NFIP would do much to alleviate
this problem. There are already signs that the felt need for
209. The act had 238 cosponsors.
210. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
211. Indeed, the National Research Council’s report on coastal risk argued that

mitigation measures have been an underutilized tool in reducing the harms
associated with coastal floods, and cited the need for stronger incentives for local
governments to participate in the Community Rating System, particularly in light
of the significant demonstrated reduction in risk associated with that participation.
See supra note 5, at 89.
212. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 3.
213. Id. at 55.
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emergency funding is sensitive to the ability of flood insurance to
cover flood damage. The post-Katrina Road Home program
provided aid only for losses not covered by insurance, and imposed a
penalty on those who were required to have flood insurance but did
not.214 The manner in which Congress reacts to floods carries its
own message. By treating floods as worthy of massive emergency
appropriations, Congress is implicitly treating floods as events that
individuals should not be expected to have planned for, events that
are unpredictable and extraordinary and whose burden will be shared
nationally. Flood insurance premiums, by contrast, carry with them
an air of inevitability, and imposing a tax penalty on those who fail to
maintain their policies sends a very different signal than a hundred
billion dollars in post-disaster aid.
V. CONCLUSION
Dealing with our rising national flood risk is, or should be, a matter
of urgency. Federal efforts to confront this problem have, over the
course of the past half-century, consisted of large-scale engineering
projects, massive post-disaster aid, and flood insurance offered at
largely below-market rates. All of these have the unfortunate effect
of shifting the burden of flood risk from those who live in flood
zones to the country as a whole, thereby making coastal living more
attractive than it should be. Individually-mandated flood insurance
with premiums set at actuarial levels could be a key tool in placing
the burden of flood risk back where it belongs, on those who are
directly affected by floods, while still providing a safety net in case
of disaster. Notably, however, mandatory flood insurance would
impose these costs before flood risks are realized, allowing us to
decide individually one of the most important questions we face
collectively: how much risk are we willing to accept?

214. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.

